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The Community Forestry Program in Nepal is a global innovation in participatory environmental 
governance that encompasses well-defined policies, institutions, and practices. The program addresses the 
twin goals of forest conservation and poverty reduction. As more than 70 percent of Nepal’s population 
depends on agriculture for their livelihood, community management of forests has been a critically 
important intervention. Through legislative developments and operational innovations over three decades, 
the program has evolved from a protection-oriented, conservation-focused agenda to a much more broad-
based strategy for forest use, enterprise development, and livelihood improvement. By April 2009, one-
third of Nepal’s population was participating in the program, directly managing more than one-fourth of 
Nepal’s forest area.  
The immediate livelihood benefits derived by rural households bolster strong collective action 
wherein local communities actively and sustainably manage forest resources. Community forests also 
became the source of diversified investment capital and raw material for new market-oriented livelihoods. 
Community forestry shows traits of political, financial, and ecological sustainability, including emergence 
of a strong legal and regulatory framework, and robust civil society institutions and networks. However, a 
continuing challenge is to ensure equitable distribution of benefits to women and marginalized groups. 
Lessons for replication emphasize experiential learning, establishment of a strong civil society network, 
flexible regulation to encourage diverse institutional modalities, and responsiveness of government and 
policymakers to a multistakeholder collaborative learning process. 
 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Community Forestry in Nepal – An Overview 
The Community Forestry Program in Nepal encompasses a set of policy and institutional innovations that 
empower local communities to manage forests for livelihoods, while also enhancing conservation 
benefits. The program was launched in the mid-1970s as part of an effort to curb the widely perceived 
crisis of Himalayan forest degradation, when the government of Nepal came to the conclusion that active 
involvement of local people in forest management was essential for forest conservation in the country. 
Nepal’s Community Forestry Program innovations encompass a well-defined legal and regulatory 
framework, participatory institutions, benefit sharing mechanisms, community-based forestry enterprises, 
and biodiversity conservation strategies. The program is considered a global innovation in the field of 
participatory environmental governance (Kumar 2002), and its history of implementation and program 
evolution usefully illustrates a path toward meeting the twin goals of conservation and poverty reduction 
(Pokharel et al. 2007; Kanel and Acharya 2008).    
Community forestry is flourishing in Nepal, improving the livelihoods of rural households in 
thousands of communities, and nurturing democracy at the grassroots despite a prolonged insurgency and 
political upheavals (Ojha and Pokharel 2005; Bk et al. 2009). Three decades of operational innovations, 
legislative developments, and evolving practice have clearly demonstrated success in terms of enhancing 
access to forest products, improving livelihood opportunities for forest-dependent people, strengthening 
local institutional capacity, and improving ecological conditions of forests (Dev et al. 2003; Ojha and 
Pokharel 2005; Subedi 2006; Pokharel et al. 2007). Community forestry appears to have stood the test of 
time, contributing to the welfare of the masses of rural poor in Nepal. By April 2009, about 1.6 million 
households or one-third of the country’s population took part in the Community Forestry Program, 
directly managing more than 1,000,000 hectares (ha), or more than one-fourth of the country’s forest 
area.
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In light of these positive effects on welfare and environmental outcomes, community forestry has 
been one of the few promising aspects of Nepal’s post-World War II history. It has often been used as a 
face-saving instrument by development actors who have been engaged in, if not responsible for, the five 
decades of “failed development” in Nepal.
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The program initially received major impetus from international agencies but later was owned 
and sustained by local actors and institutions. During the early 1980s, Nepal’s mountains were widely 
perceived as the site of a double crisis, affecting both the environment and livelihoods locally and beyond 
(Eckholm 1976). Around the same time, a global environmental movement was gathering momentum. 
The Nepal Himalaya became a matter of concern, and technical and financial support began to pour in 
from international agencies (Gutman 1991), initially to establish forest plantations as a quick fix but later 
to address policy and institutional drivers of deforestation (Gilmour and Fisher 1991). The first 
institutional shift occurred in 1978, when a forest regulation
 Community forestry in Nepal has had a positive image not 
only in the fields of development and natural resource management, but also more widely from a 
governance perspective, with the assertion that the local-level institutions for forest management (known 
as Community Forest User Groups or CFUGs) and their networks provide a model of democratic 
governance (Ojha and Pokharel 2005).  
3
                                                       
1 Current forest cover in Nepal is 5.8 million ha, according to official statistics (DFRS 1999). The results of the National 
Forest Inventory show that Nepal has 4.2 million ha (29 percent) of forest area and an additional 1.6 million ha (10.6 percent) 
shrubs. These forests are distributed across the three geographical regions of the country. The middle mountains represent about 
48 percent of the forest area, whereas the forest in the plains (Terai) is nearly 25 percent of total forest land. The remaining forest 
area is distributed across the high mountains of the Himalayas.   
 was enacted that provided local government 
bodies (Panchayats) with limited rights to manage designated forest areas (Malla 1997). Later, in the early 
1990s, a more sweeping devolutionary shift occurred through the promulgation of an entirely new Forest 
2 See Shrestha (1998) and Pandey (1999) for an explanation of development failures in Nepal.  
3 The regulation was “Panchayat Forest and Panchayat-protected Forest Rules, 1978.”   
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Act 1993, which allowed forest-dependent communities to directly participate in and take control of 
forest management at the local level.  
Community forestry has evolved in the context of progressive political change in Nepal, first as 
the government moved away from the Panchayat system under Nepal’s feudal monarchy (until 1990), 
then through a multiparty system with a constitutional monarchy (until 2006), and finally to the currently 
evolving inclusive and republican multiparty polity. With these political changes, local people have 
increasingly been able to claim rights over forests as active political agents rather than as passive 
recipients of government service (Paudel, Banjade, and Dahal 2009). Through wider civic movement as 
well as the expansion of CFUG networks nationally, the traditional top-down state power has been 
replaced by a strong civil society, and the discourse and practice of community forestry in Nepal is now 
shared equally by the government and civil society (Luintel 2006). Spaces for and practices of 
deliberation among diverse actors have expanded, forging collaboration and social learning in support of 
decentralized and community-based management of forests in Nepal (Ojha, Timsina, and Khanal 2007; 
McDougall et al. 2008). This depth of local ownership, action, and empowerment in the Community 
Forestry Program facilitated achievements within local communities that substantially affected household 
livelihoods (Table 1). The overview summarizes the policy and institutional processes that enabled such 
depth of ownership to occur at the local level, as well as the impact pathway (Figure 1) from community 
forestry to improved livelihoods at the household level. 
Table 1. Summary indicators of community forestry impacts in Nepal 
Indicator  Number  Share  Source 
Households directly affected  1,659,775  (32% of total population)  DoF 2009 
Number of CFUGs  14,439    DoF 2009 




(100% of all districts)  DoF 2009 
Area of forest under CFUG management   1,229,669  (25% of total forest area)  DoF 2009 
It is worth noting here that the evidence linking community forestry to improvements in food 
security is still being accumulated. Despite more than 30 years of innovation in participatory 
environmental governance through community forestry, the depth and breadth of material on impact is 
still somewhat limited, at least in terms of economic analysis. However, evidence from other disciplines 
and from a range of observers and stakeholders—from academicians to communities themselves—
indicate that community forestry in Nepal is a success in terms of improving natural resource 
management, rural governance, and institutional reform.  
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Figure 1. Community forestry and food security linkage pathways 
 
In terms of policy processes, the legal rights for communities to participate in forest management 
were specified in Nepal’s Forest Act of 1993 and further articulated in the state’s Forest Regulations of 
1995. The 1993 Forest Act provided CFUGs, which are local institutions comprised of village residents 
using common forests, the authority to undertake management decisions regarding forest resources 
(Acharya 2002). A series of Forest Department operational guidelines and directives further enunciated 
the policy, clarified the rights of various actors, and sought to guide community forestry implementation 
(Acharya 2002). Forest use is not unrestricted in either the legal framework or in practice. CFUGs are 
required to pay taxes to the government when they sell any forest products outside the CFUG. 
Restrictions on certain species are also issued from time to time. The state retains ownership of forests, 
while communities hold the rights to use the forests and make management decisions. 
The Forest Act of 1993 requires that a group of households wishing to constitute a CFUG prepare 
a constitution under the provisions of the Act and submit it for registration at the local District Forest 
Office (DFO), which then provides a certificate of registration. The new CFUG then prepares an 
Operational Plan for forest management, with technical assistance from forest officials and increasingly 
from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The operational plan stipulates management goals, 
activities to be undertaken, and rules of forest product utilization. In principle, CFUGs can determine 
which forest products can be harvested (though the harvested amount must be within the limits prescribed 
by foresters in the CFUG’s Operational Plan), set the price of various products, receive and distribute 
income, and use revenue for community development activities (Acharya 2002).  In practice, they often 
must seek permission from forest officials, and at times extra-legal instructions are imposed by forest 
officials against the will of CFUGs (Paudel, Banjade, and Dahal 2009). The hierarchy of regulatory 
instruments designed to facilitate community forestry processes sometimes constrain the rights of local 
people, as was experienced with the forest inventory guidelines of 2000 (Ojha 2002). For example, 




Financial capital: loans and subsidies, 
employment 
Social/political capital: tenurial security, 
stability of access rights, equitable rules 





Wider socioeconomic context  
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whereas the Forest Act of 1993 recognizes the CFUG as a perpetually self-governed institution, with 
rights to independently manage forest products and fix the prices of forest products, the Community 
Forestry Program directives of 1995 (clause 3c) enable DFOs to set conditions for forest management. 
Likewise, the inventory guidelines provide forest officials with the authority to decide the types and 
amounts of forest product to be harvested purely on “scientific basis,” overriding the political autonomy 
granted by the Forest Act (Paudel and Ojha 2008).  
In terms of institutional processes, community forestry in Nepal encompasses the collective 
action of people across nested levels of organization, from relatively small and directly interacting groups 
(the CFUGs) to large and formally structured institutions (CFUGs and their networks) at subnational and 
national levels. The areas of forest and sizes of the CFUGs vary substantially, as there is no set legal limit, 
and depends on the “willingness and ability” of the community to manage a forest, according to the Forest 
Act of 1993. Community forests in Nepal range from less than 1 ha to more than 4,000 ha (DOF 2009), 
and the average size of a forest managed by a CFUG is 79 ha (Kanel and Kandel 2004). Likewise, the 
number of households in a CFUG ranges from fewer than a dozen to more than 10,000 households,
4
A CFUG may include all members of a village, a select subgroup of households, or people from 
another village or even from another district, irrespective of administrative boundaries. The institution is 
inclusive rather than exclusive of households in the village, and in practice all households of one or more 
villages become members of a CFUG, representing diverse interests in forests. Interest-based subgroups 
(such as fuelwood sellers, landless, and nontimber forest cultivators) are often formed to articulate diverse 
interests in CFUG decisionmaking processes. Other common modes of citizen participation within 
CFUGs include a wide array of institutional mechanisms such as Tole (hamlet) based decisionmaking, 
elected executive committees, annual assemblies, and formulation of forest management plans.  
 and 
the average is 111 households.  
Governance arrangements for each CFUG are defined by the constitution and by the forest 
management operational plan, both registered and approved by the DFO. Each CFUG prepares its own 
constitution, defining the social arrangements, responsibilities, and rights of the group. These may vary 
from group to group to adapt local traditions and practices but fall within a standard set of guidelines and 
norms (as provided by the Community Forestry Guidelines of 2008, which tend to be mechanistically 
implemented by the forestry staff while forming a CFUG). The operational plan specifies how the forest 
is managed and utilized and also serves as an agreement between the Forest Department and the 
CFUG. Each CFUG elects a specified number of members (usually 9 or 11) to an executive committee, 
for a term ranging from one to three years. The executive committee carries out day-to-day decisions 
about forest management on behalf of the entire CFUG, and it is potentially susceptible to control by 
elites within the community if effective mechanisms for downward accountability to the entire CFUG are 
not in place (Kanel and Kandel 2004). In sum, Nepal’s Community Forestry Program has made great 
strides in institutionalizing a series of important rights, including decisionmaking, empowerment over 
forest management and use, and access to forest resources at the community level.   
These community forestry policy and institutional innovations contribute to improved welfare 
and livelihood security in Nepal through two distinct pathways: (1) directly through increased household 
access to forest food products (natural capital), and (2) indirectly through positive impacts on household 
incomes, employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, livelihood diversification, and broader 
community development activities made possible through the Community Forestry Program (financial, 
social, physical, and political capitals) (Figure 1). The contribution of forestry to overall livelihood 
security is critically important in Nepal because more than 70 percent of Nepal’s population depends on 
agricultural livelihoods that encompass complex interactions between agriculture, forestry, and livestock 
systems. Farmers depend on green fodder from forests to feed their livestock, particularly during the dry 
                                                       
4 Larger CFUGs are found in the low-lying Terai area where there is no consistent implementation of community forestry 
policy, owing to conflicts among communities, political parties, and the government agencies over who should control and 
manage Terai forest lands. Although larger in area, the CFUGs in the Terai compose only 7.3 percent of the total number of 
CFUGs in Nepal (Kanel and Kandel 2004).   
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season when forests are often the only available source of fodder and grass (Dougill et al. 2001). The 
primary cooking fuel in the country is firewood, with 69 percent of households using firewood as their 
main source (Pokharel, Dahal, and Byrne 2009).  
Forest-derived products generate additional income for households, supply household needs such 
as fuelwood, and also provide some food sources directly. This is especially the case for poorer 
households with little or marginal quality land. Such households are often unable to meet annual food 
requirements through their own agricultural holdings (Pandit and Thapa 2004). A wide range of 
nontimber forest products (NTFPs) are harvested both for subsistence (such as food, medicines, and 
utensils) and for sale.
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Several studies provide insights into the contribution of NTFPs, although we caution that more 
rigorous study of the relationship between community forestry activities and household livelihoods is 
needed. In one study, NTFPs provided households with poor quality land with an additional mean annual 
income that was equivalent to 46 percent of household earnings from field crops; it augmented the 
incomes of 81 percent of the 152 households surveyed (Pandit and Thapa 2004). Studies have calculated 
that NTFP earnings account for 14–25 percent of total household annual income in various districts of 
Nepal (den Hertog and Wiersum 2000; Pandit and Thapa 2004).  
  
Community forestry has thus contributed to improving and diversifying livelihoods by mobilizing 
locally available and communally owned natural capital (forests), both directly through the promotion of 
wild edibles and indirectly by providing financial and social safety nets to the poor. Forest-based incomes 
account for a substantial portion of overall household income in many rural areas of Nepal, while 
products extracted and total value often vary by household wealth. Products such as timber require greater 
up-front cost and are thus more accessible to wealthier households, while poorer households may have 
greater overall dependency on forest products to meet subsistence household needs. Forest products 
derived through community forestry accounted for 20–25 percent of mean household income for 50 
households surveyed in one middle hill district, regardless of wealth class. That equated to an annual 
community forestry-based income ranging from Nepal rupees (NRs) 20,496 (US$265) in the wealthiest 
households to NRs 11,815,, equivalent to US$152, in the poorest households, where forest products 
accounted for a 6  percent greater contribution to overall income than earnings from agriculture and 
livestock (Arun 2004). 
CFUGs not only manage forests for direct benefits to household livelihoods but also have 
emerged as a local agency for community development, social inclusion, and democratic civic 
engagement (Pokharel et al. 2007), so that household welfare is also impacted through these indirect 
pathways. CFUGs retain 100 percent of revenues generated from their forest, but they must designate 25 
percent of this income for forest development activities as per the Forest Act. Examples of development 
activities undertaken with CFUG revenues include improving irrigation canals and water distribution, 
supplementing teacher’s salaries, using forest products for school or other public building construction, or 
providing microfinancing for community members (Dev et al. 2003; Adhikari, Williams, and Lovett 
2007). Methods of revenue generation vary widely across the 16,000 CFUGs that are operational in Nepal 
and include charging members or outsiders a fee for permission to collect various forest products. At 
times, such a system of charging members has generated debate over whether the system is friendly to the 
poor, and significant investments are made by community forestry projects to sensitize and facilitate 
CFUGs to undertake ranking of forest users and to formulate differential (equitable) rules for forest 
product access and benefit sharing (CIFOR 2007). Annual CFUG incomes vary widely, with CFUGs in 
the Terai earning the most on average (NRs 90,500 or $1,169, n = 916 CFUGs), followed by those in the 
middle hills (NRs 9,100 or $118, n = 9,353 CFUGs) and the high hills (NRs 4,100 or $53, n = 2,456 
CFUGs) (Kanel and Kandel 2004). 
                                                       
5 Nepal has nearly 1,000 plant species of known uses, of which an overwhelming 700 species are medicinal, 440 wild food-
yielding species, and more than 100 fodder species. Of these, more than 160 species are used as commercial nontimber forest 
products (Subedi 2006).   
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Community forestry innovations appear to demonstrate traits of sustainability on political, 
financial, and ecological dimensions. Politically, it is supported by a strong legal and regulatory 
framework and wins the confidence of all major political parties. There are strong networks of civil 
society and intellectuals supporting and expanding community forestry at local to global levels. Journals 
such as the Journal of Forest and Livelihoods (www.forestaction.org) have prominently featured articles 
on community forestry in Nepal for the past several years and have served as an outlet of information on 
the program for a wide range of issues. There is a strong sense of awareness on civil rights among CFUGs 
which have established systems of internal governance. CFUG management of forests also appears to be 
sustainable financially. Of an estimated average running cost of NRs 119,100 per year for a CFUG, 71 
percent is borne by CFUGs themselves, 16 percent from donors and 13 percent from the government 
(Pokharel et al. 2008). CFUG contributions include primarily labor costs (NRs 76,500, or 64 percent), 
plus a small proportion of cash (NRs 8,000, or 7 percent) (Pokharel et al. 2008). From an ecological 
standpoint, anecdotal observations and quantitative studies support the premise that community forestry 
practices have improved forest condition. A recent study reported that 74 percent of the forest area 
managed by CFUGs was in “good” condition, compared to 19 percent in “degraded” condition (Kanel 
and Kandel 2004). Others have reported that CFUGs compare favorably to government forests in terms of 
change in forest condition (Nagendra et al. 2008).  
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2.  THE INTERVENTION: HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY FORESTRY 
Forests have historically held a central place in local livelihood practices and national politics in Nepal 
because of their importance in rural livelihoods and state revenues (Ojha 2008). Analysts have usefully 
delineated three phases of forestry in Nepal – privatization (until 1957), nationalization (1957 to the late 
1970s), and decentralization (from the late 1970s onward) (Hobley 1996). Most forests in rural Nepal 
were controlled and managed by local communities until the late 1950s, when the state took control. The 
call for citizen participation began in the late 1970s when the government explicitly admitted that it could 
not protect the country’s forests without the active cooperation of local forest-dependent citizens.  
Throughout Nepal’s modern history—the past 240 years—the Nepali state has largely been 
controlled by either the Shaha or Rana families, except for three brief periods of democracy in the 1950s, 
1990s, and after 2006. Under the control of these families, the state polity retained a strong feudal 
character, whereby economic surplus flowed from the peasant farmers to the ruling elites through 
networks of locally based feudal lords (Regmi 1978), although that control apparatus has gradually 
declined since 1951. Until the Private Forest Nationalization Act was enforced in 1957, all forests were 
controlled by state-sponsored local functionaries. As the state moved further into the era of planned 
development after World War II, national bureaucracies assumed political–economic control of resources 
in ways that served the interests of the ruling elites (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2002). A number of 
laws were enacted to enforce national control over forests, which effectively expanded the forest 
bureaucracy and excluded local people.
6
Key Policies for Community Forestry in Nepal 
 Although it was implicitly assumed that transferring forests from 
private groups to the state would enhance people’s access to forest resources, in reality the state instituted 
stringent regulations to exclude people from controlling forest resources and created a strong techno-
bureaucratic field (Ojha 2008; Malla 2000).  
Efforts to share power over forests with local people started in 1978 with the institution of Panchayat 
(local government) forest regulations, prompted by the central government’s realization that the state 
forest bureaucracy could not protect forests without engaging the local people.
7
During the 1970s, the recognition of Himalayan degradation as a serious environmental crisis 
(Eckholm 1976) increased pressure on international development institutions and donor governments to 
contribute to the conservation of the Himalayas. This led to a shift in the development discourse away 
from an emphasis on infrastructure and technology transfer toward environmental issues (Cameron 1998). 
Moreover, Nepal’s strategic geopolitical situation (being located between China and India) and fragile 
environmental condition attracted donors (Metz 1995) who viewed forestry and the environment as the 
key elements of integrated conservation and development projects.
 This move was part of the 
Monarchical Panchayat system’s strategy to thwart growing anti-Panchayat resistance, by offering people 
some economic and symbolic spaces in the local Panchayat. In the meantime, donors were exerting 
growing pressure on the government to shift away from centralized practices of development toward more 
decentralized processes.  
8
Several international agencies assisted the Nepalese government in formulating the Master Plan 
for the Forestry Sector (MPFS), which recognized the need for local people’s participation in the 
conservation and management of the country’s forest resources. In 1989, as the MPFS was being finalized 
and formally adopted by the government, an ongoing movement against the Panchayat system by the 
  
                                                       
6 Two laws are noteworthy here: the Forest Act of 1961 and the Forest Protection Special Act of 1967. The latter even 
authorized local forest guards to shoot people who used forests illegally.  
7 The Panchayat system was headed directly by the king. It has three tiers of elected bodies of Panchayat politicians – 
Village Panchayat, District Panchayat and National Panchayat. Despite the election of Panchayat members, the real power was 
derived from the monarchy. 
8 The World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) initially influenced the national 
government toward the process of devolution of forest governance, followed by a group of bilateral and international actors.  
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citizenry also culminated in the reinstatement of multiparty democracy in the country. The decisions of 
subsequent governments further strengthened the regulatory framework of community-based forest 
management in line with the MPFS.  
The most significant regulatory development in support of community forestry was the enactment 
of the Forest Act in 1993 by the first elected parliament after the 1990 movement for democracy. The 
1993 Forest Act guaranteed the rights of local people in forest management MFSC 1995), as briefly 
summarized in Table 2. Nepal became the world’s first country to enact such radical forest legislation, 
allowing local communities to take full control of government forest patches under a community forestry 
program (Malla 1997; Kumar 2002). Meanwhile, international agencies continued to support the process 
of reorienting government forestry officials to work as facilitators of community-based forest 
management and away from their traditional policing roles (Gronow and Shrestha 1991). 
Table 2: CFUG rights as per the Forest Act (1993) and Forest Regulation (1995) 
1. Right to self-governance 
•  Communities have rights to form a Community Forest User Group (CFUG) as per their 
willingness, capacity, and customary rights. 
•  Community forest boundaries will not be restricted to existing administrative or political 
boundaries. 
•  Government can dismantle the CFUG if the latter is found to engage in large scale 
deforestation but it is the duty of the government to reconstitute the CFUG.  
•  CFUGs can elect, select or change executive committee anytime. 
•  CFUGs can punish members who break their rules. 
•  CFUGs can amend or revise their constitution any time. 
2. Right to forest management and utilization  
•  There is no limit to the forest area that can be handed over to communities. 
•  CFUGs can make optimal use of their forest by growing cash crops together with forest 
crops. 
•  CFUGs can mortgage their standing forest products with financial institutions to obtain loans. 
•  CFUGs can utilize their funds for any purpose (but 25% of income from forest must be spent 
in forest development)  
•  CFUGs can freely fix prices and market their forest produce. 
•  CFUGs can establish enterprises and make profits. 
•  CFUGs can seek support from any organization. 
•  CFUGs can raise funds by various forestry and non-forestry means with all income going to 
group funds with no requirement for sharing financial revenues with government. 
•  CFUGs can invest in any areas, persons or development activities according to the decision of 
CFUG assembly. 
Sources: Pokharel et al. (2008): Forest Act 1993; Forest Regulation 1995.  
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Scaling Up: Policy, Institutional, and Methodological Innovations 
The Community Forestry Program in Nepal evolved from a primarily protection-oriented, conservation-
focused agenda during its initial years of implementation to a much broader-based strategy for forest use, 
enterprise development, and livelihood improvement. This occurred through an often conflictual process 
spread out over more than a decade, during which sustained efforts to engage in policy dialogue with a 
range of community forestry stakeholders helped to clarify issues and develop a common vision. A well-
recognized attempt in this regard has been the national workshops held every five years since 1987. 
Along with the evolution of community forestry in Nepal, the government forestry authority (mainly the 
Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation and its Department of Forests) has also reinvented itself as a 
facilitator of community institutions and away from traditional policing roles (Kanel and Acharya 2008; 
Niraula 2004a). Evolution occurred across policies, institutions, and implementation modalities, 
ultimately leading to a much stronger, more sustainable, and effective Community Forestry system 
(Pokharel et al. 2008). The experience of community forestry has also been adapted and scaled up in 
different contexts in Nepal, leading to at least five other institutional regimes of forest governance: 
leasehold forestry, collaborative forest management, community-based watershed management, 
integrated conservation and development, and protected area buffer zone forestry (Ojha, Timsina, et al. 
2008).  
One of the keys to the establishment and successful outcome of Nepal’s community forestry 
system was the creation of appropriate institutional structures at local, meso, and national levels that 
included downward accountability and relatively unrestricted decisionmaking at the local level, and 
effective cross-scale interactions among these various institutions. At the local level, this included 
provisions for subcommittees within CFUGs and the establishment of elected hamlet-level representatives 
to ensure that concerns of various constituencies within the CFUGs were expressed (McDougall et al. 
2008). Meso-level institutions performed key facilitation, technical, and information exchange functions 
between national priorities and local contexts. Such interactions particularly contributed to better 
exploitation and wider dissemination of market opportunities by CFUGs (Banjade et al. 2007), which in 
turn had positive impacts on household livelihoods.  
Other institutional factors in the successful evolution of community forestry included efforts to 
improve the inclusion of all social groups (especially after the mid-1990s, when the Maoist movement 
also gained momentum through the agenda of inclusion), concomitant democratic processes (Pokharel et 
al. 2007), and provision of adequate time and space for frequent discussion, exchange, adaptation, 
inclusion, and interaction among stakeholders (Banjade et al. 2006).  
Policy innovations that enhanced the successful scaling up of the program included progressive 
legislation (Forest Act 1993), which also supported strong, autonomous, and self-governed village 
institutions (CFUGs) and clarification of appropriate property rights arrangements for community 
members through the provision of an Operational Plan for community forest management. 
Deconcentration of authority from the centralized state to the district-level bureaucracy, in which district 
officials were given the authority to constitute CFUGs, also played an important role (Agrawal and 
Ostrom 2001).  
A variety of methodological innovations also helped to improve community forestry 
implementation, such as participatory action learning  (Malla et al. 2002), adaptive collaborative 
management  (McDougall at al. 2008), participatory and self-monitoring approaches (Banjade et al. 
2008), and approaches that specifically targeted pro-poor livelihood improvements, linking civil society, 
governance, and democracy with natural resource management (Luintel, Bhatterai, and Ojha 2006). Such 
innovations addressed relationships among a wide range of participants in the forest governance arena and 
have triggered pro-poor forestry practices (Kanel and Subedi 2004). Governance practices that were 
changed encompass a broad range of activities – learning; planning; decisionmaking; mobilizing the 
marginalized groups to create pressures on elites; developing clearer vision, indicators, and purpose of the 
Forest User Groups and related Community Forestry organizations; monitoring; promoting transparency;  
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re-electing executive committees; creating ownership in the organizational change processes; improving 
communication; and promoting public hearings and auditing.  
As a result of improvement in governance practices, changes in governance outcomes included 
more equitable benefit sharing; enhanced transparency, participation, and accountability; and improved 
pro-poor resource management practices (Luintel, Bhatterai, and Ojha 2006; Shrestha et al. 2009). Many 
of these innovations came in response to the emergence of second generation issues in the mid-1990s, and 
were facilitated by national NGOs, often with technical support from international organizations and 
bilateral donor projects.  
Since 1990, the process of community forestry has been increasingly promoted and scaled up by 
an expanding public sphere, often operating outside of government and donor projects (Ojha, Timsina, 
and Khanal 2007). There are increasing instances of proactive engagement of civil groups in forest 
governance in recent years in Nepal. Of particular importance has been the establishment of a meso-level 
umbrella institution of CFUGs that represents the interests of local- level actors and serves as an 
intermediary between national and local processes. This nationwide network of CFUGs, known as the 
Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN), has emerged as a key player in forest 
sector policy debates (Ojha 2002; Ojha and Timsina 2008). These civil society groups have further 
politicized the practice of forestry and in many respects provided a deliberative bridge between people 
and the state (Ojha, Timsina, and Khanal 2007). Along with NGO alliances, it has brought civil society 
perspectives into the policymaking process that used to be dominated by technocrats and bureaucrats. The 
most important policy issue in which FECOFUN has made significant contributions in the past few years 
concerns the extension of CFUG rights over forest resources in the hills as well as in the Terai. Through 
FECOFUN, the legal provisions relating to community forestry were spread to areas where there were no 
prior donor-driven projects, or where district forest offices (DFOs) were not as enthusiastic about 
community forestry implementation (in the Terai, for example). In addition, FECOFUN has played the 
role of CFUG watchdog in national and international policy arenas. FECOFUN’s awareness-raising 
activities have helped to enhance the political capital of CFUGs beyond the traditional patron-client 
relationship with the Department of Forests.  
Successful scaling up of community forestry also required a nationwide overhaul of local and 
DFOs, with an emphasis on the reorientation of forest officials. This enables DFOs and forest officials to 
reorient their skills toward co-management, extension, and assistance rather than to their previous role as 
the dominant authority and decisionmaker in forest management (Acharya 2002).   
Lastly, scholars have further enumerated a number of specific conditions and factors that played a 
significant role in the successful evolution of community forestry in Nepal. These include 
•  media projection of the crisis of Himalayan degradation and consequent international 
assistance (Gutman 1991);  
•  inaccessibility of Nepal’s hill and mountain forests for commercial exploitation;  
•  inability of the Forest Department to manage forests effectively, especially in the middle and 
high hills (Gilmour and Fisher 1991; Subedi 2006);  
•  emergence of a multiparty political system in 1990 and consequent expansion of civil society 
spaces (Ojha 2006);  
•  willingness of the elected government to legally empower local communities to manage 
forests (Ojha 2006);  
•  presence of existing forest-based livelihood systems in rural Nepal and incentives for local 
people to participate in forest management for a range of forest products and livelihood 
opportunities (Gilmour and Fisher 1991);  
•  presence of existing dense social networks and traditional models of collective action around 
local forest management in Nepal (Fisher 1989; Chhetri and Pandey 1992);   
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•  continued tradition of piloting new approaches and reflection among Community Forest 
Program stakeholders, including regular nationwide workshops every five years since the 
1980s (Pokharel et al. 2007; Ojha and Timsina 2008);  
•  increased research and scholarly interests in community forestry; and 
•  breakdown of traditional power relationships through political movements and emergence of 
“subaltern” groups taking leadership power at the CFUG level (Bhattarai 2007).  
Issues Faced During Implementation 
A number of challenging issues were encountered during implementation of Nepal’s Community Forestry 
Program, and some continue today. These include ongoing evolution of extension skills and technical 
capacity within government institutions to move beyond a blueprint forest protection model toward a 
livelihood-oriented system and issues related to equitable distribution of community forestry benefits 
among local CFUG institutions and households. 
Management models, operational plans, and related implementation processes initially adhered to 
blueprint models provided by the Forest Department and focused on forest protection rather than 
livelihood improvement (Dougill et al. 2001). Over time, management and operational plans gradually 
evolved to reflect individual CFUG goals and took on a much greater livelihood-oriented emphasis. This 
was also reflected in the design of forestry programs under a livelihoods framework, such as the UK’s 
Department for International Development’s Livelihoods and Forestry Program, which began in 2000. 
This went hand in hand with the adaptation of appropriate extension skills within the Forest Department 
and DFOs, in order to provide effective technical assistance to CFUGs and to assist with management 
decisionmaking (Dev et al. 2003).  
Forest management also became more technically complex beyond the initial simplistic plans. 
Initially, CFUGs were required to have only one document containing both constitutional aspects and 
forest management rules (Ojha, Khanal, and Shrestha 1997). Since 1995, two separate documents have 
been required – a constitution and a forest management operational plan. Additional technical aspects of 
community forestry included developing readily usable tables to estimate biomass, timber volume, and 
annual harvesting yields (Acharya 2002). An inventory guideline was enforced in 2000, which was 
directed more toward technocratic control than to facilitating democratic forest governance (Ojha 2002). 
However, stakeholders later came together and developed a common understanding on the format and 
process of forest inventory, which was incorporated into the revised forest inventory guidelines of 2004 
(Paudel and Ojha 2008).  
Another set of challenges stemmed from issues related to the distribution of benefits (forest 
products and income), social exclusion and marginalization of traditionally disadvantaged groups, elite 
capture of benefits and decisionmaking processes, and transparency in managing CFUG funds (Kanel and 
Kandel 2004; Chhetri 2006). After these problems were identified, several CFUGs began to include 
explicit provisions for greater benefits to poorer groups, women, lower caste groups, and other 
marginalized groups in their operational plans (Bhattarai 2007; Banjade et al. 2008; Kunwar et al. 2009). 
Bhattarai (2007) identifies interactions and knowledge networks that influenced the perceptions of local 
elites about themselves and the poor, thereby triggering pro-poor forest management and utilization 
practices in the CFUG. Pro-poor innovations generally include designating loans, land for cultivation, or 
areas of the community forest for fodder collection to be explicitly reserved for marginalized groups or 
the poorest households and setting up women-dominated small business enterprises (Joshi et al. 2006). In 
several cases, community fund-raising through sale of forest products has also been used to fund rural 
infrastructure or social development works that address the needs and concerns of the poor and 
disadvantaged. 
Equitable rather than equal distribution of forest products and benefits has been crucial to 
improving livelihoods, because the poorest households in Nepal are more dependent on forest products 
and forest-derived sources of livelihoods, since they have little or no land of their own from which they  
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can obtain such products. An equitable distribution method for forest products, in which the CFUG 
collectively ranks households on the basis of relative wealth and subsistence needs, has led to greater 
livelihood security for the most vulnerable households and gone further toward meeting community 
forestry’s poverty alleviation goals (Shrestha and McManus 2008). The Livelihoods and Forestry 
Program in Nepal has supported a number of CFUGs to provide exclusive management rights to groups 
of poor households for cultivation of income-generating crops and agroforestry. Although currently few 
in number, some CFUGs do provide community lands to their landless or near-landless members, so they 
can earn their living through cultivation of medicinal herbs or other crops. Several CFUGs give 
preference to poor members or women in locally created jobs, such as processing of handmade paper or 
working as nursery laborers (Subedi 2006). Other examples are listed in Box 1. 
Box 1. Examples of pro-poor provisions in CFUG constitutions and operational plans 
•  Subsidies in prices of forest products 
•  Reservation of spots for the poor, women, and Dalits (untouchables) on community forest 
committees and decision making bodies 
•  Special provisions for the distribution of forest products to vulnerable groups (for example, 
charcoal to blacksmiths, products freely distributed to victims of natural disasters, single women, 
or conflict victims) 
•  Allocation of CFUG funds and low interest loans for income-generating activities 
•  Forest resource management with allocation of Community Forestry Program land to poor users 
•  Scholarships to children from poor families 
Source: Bhattarai 2009.  
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3.  IMPACT OF COMMUNITY FORESTRY 
Rural Livelihoods and Welfare 
Community forestry appears to have had a net positive effect on livelihoods and a range of other 
development concerns in Nepal, resulting in direct and indirect positive impacts on rural livelihoods and 
welfare. However, we caution that rigorous studies demonstrating significant increases in household 
income as a result of Nepal’s Community Forestry Program are sparse in the available literature. Studies 
that attempt to further disentangle complex relationships among community forestry activities, unrelated 
development interventions, and economic and other aspects of household livelihoods, particularly through 
rigorous research designs that control for external factors, would contribute importantly to a clearer 
understanding of community forestry impacts on household income in Nepal.  
Evidence of direct improvements to livelihoods include an enhanced supply of wild edibles used 
by the poor, increased availability of forest products to farmers, and more reliable product supply 
(Acharya 2002; Dev et al. 2003). Indirect but crucially important improvements to livelihoods occurred 
through increased employment opportunities and more diversified livelihood portfolios. Community 
forestry has enabled households to diversify their livelihood strategies to a greater extent than was 
possible before, including undertaking forest-based income-generating activities like cultivating spices in 
the forest understory and tapping resin from selected tree species (Dev et al. 2003).  
A longitudinal study of 2,700 households from 26 CFUGs in the Koshi Hills may illustrate the 
large-scale impacts of community forestry on poverty alleviation and livelihood security (Tables 3 and 4), 
though issues of research design limit certainty over the outcomes. In that study, a well-being ranking 
conducted in the sampled CFUGs during two time periods across five years showed that 46 percent of 
poor users (very poor and poor) moved into higher well-being categories, facilitated in part through their 
participation in CFUGs that directly supported livelihood improvement and capacity-building activities 
(Chapagain and Banjade 2009). A separate study found that the average annual household income of 
forest user members increased by 113 percent over a period from 2003 to 2008, from NRs 54,995 in 2003 
to NRs 117,075 in 2008 ($710 to $1,512) (Chapagain, Subedi, and Rana 2009). This represented a 61 
percent increase after adjusting for inflation and should be seen in the light of Bhattarai and Dhungana’s 
(2008) claim that CFUGs have harnessed less than 40 percent of the revenue potential of their community 
forests. Chapagain, Subedi, and Rana (2009) found a difference of NRs 16,153 ($208) between household 
incomes, with and without income-generating activities supported by CFUGs, signifying the importance 
of user group support. But, research design limitations in these studies unfortunately preclude the 
attribution of these positive income changes solely to the Community Forestry Program, because control 
groups were not employed in the longitudinal comparisons of household income, nor were changes in 
non-CFUG sources of income controlled for over the period of the study. 
Table 3. Changes in well-being status for 2,700 households from 26 CFUGs in the Koshi Hills, 
Nepal (2002-2008) 
Caste 
No change  Change (+)  Change (-) 
VP-VP  P-P  Oth-Oth  VP-P  VP-Oth  P-Oth  P-VP  Oth-P  Oth-VP 
Dalit  58%  43%  100%  29%  13%  51%  6%  0%  0% 
Ethnic 
minorities  53%  67%  100%  36%  11%  32%  1%  0%  0% 
Advantag
ed castes  55%  59%  100%  36%  7%  39%  1%  0%  0% 
Total  56%  61%  100%  35%  9%  37%  1%  0%  0% 
Note: VP=Very poor, P=Poor, Oth=Others. 
Source: Chapagain and Banjade 2009.  
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Table 4. Annual employment opportunities in community forestry in the Koshi Hills  
Area 
Number of CFUGs 
generating employment   Total population 
Employment: Person days 
per CFUG per year 
Forest management  510  63,888  125.19 
Community development  340  9,411  27.66 
Office management/ office secretary  161  9,153  56.97 
Teachers  172  39,137  226.92 
Enterprises  95  15,937  168.64 
Total  1,278  137,526  605.38 
Source: Adapted from Chapagain and Banjade 2009. 
One recent study that did employ control groups found that economic benefits from Community 
Forestry occurred, but tended to accrue at the CFUG level rather than household level (Maharjan et al 
2009). Conducted in eight Community Forestry villages and two control villages across four districts of 
Nepal, the study did not find evidence for an increase in household-level income as a result of 
Community Forestry activities. However, the study emphasized positive and substantial welfare impacts 
in terms of improved physical infrastructure, skills development for potential employment, net-working 
and other forms of social capital, and political representation, often made possible through CFUG funding 
or other Community Forestry activities (Maharjan et al 2009). 
Indirect contributions to household incomes appear to also be realized through revenue-
generating activities undertaken by CFUGs, such as the sale of forest products, that are then used for a 
range of community development initiatives (Dhakal, Bigsby, and Cullen 2005; 2007). One study of 23 
CFUGs in the middle hills, in which quantitative surveys about FUG finances and management were 
administered to FUG members and government employees, found that successfully managed community 
forests (defined by the authors on the basis of comparatively higher revenue returns per hectare of forest 
managed, among other significant factors included in a hierarchical cluster analysis) generated a mean 
annual revenue of $18.50 per hectare of forest and spent a greater proportion of their revenue on 
community development (57 percent) and forest management (32 percent) activities, compared to CFUGs 
with lower per-hectare revenue returns (Dongol, Hughey, and Bigsby 2002). CFUG-based enterprises 
provide income and employment for community members, and in many cases members of poorer 
households, who are typically more vulnerable to food shortages because of their socioeconomic status, 
are given priority for jobs (Dev et al. 2003).  For example, 617 CFUGs from five districts in Nepal’s 
Midwestern region provided 825,988 person/days of employment over a one year period (2007–08), and 
90 percent of that employment went to people from poor and very poor households (LFP 2008, cited in 
Bhattarai 2009) (Table 5). Employment opportunities may include work as a forest watcher or wage 
laborer during various silvicultural operations, and CFUGs often prioritize jobs as timber workers, 
nursery technicians, fuelwood sellers, and resin collectors for poorer members (Bhattarai 2009). 
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Table 5. Paid employment generated by FUGs in Midwest areas of Nepal during 2064/65 fiscal year 
(2007/08 in the European calendar) 
Types of work  #of 
CFUGs 
Paid employment/person days  Very poor 
& poor 
Other  Total 
Dalit  Janajati  Minority  Other 
Forest 
management 
370  117,921  290,028  11,025  164,242  549,260  33,956  583,216 
Nursery 
management 
87  3,375  44,411  261  8,364  53,930  2,471  56,411 
Others  160  57,623  60,452  0  68,286  138,892  30,994  186,361 
Total  617  178,919  394,891  11,286  240,892  742,082  67,421  825,988 
Source: LFP 2008. 
Pro-poor mechanisms for the distribution of forest products have also had positive effects on 
household ability to meet livelihood needs. Forest products may be distributed at subsidized rates to poor 
households and at no cost to women-headed and extremely poor families (Bhatterai 2009). For instance, 
Mahila CFUG of Kalimati Rampur has moved from an equal distribution of forest products among all 
members to an equitable distribution system that provides forest products at subsidized rates to more 
vulnerable members of the CFUG. Timber is sold at either 65 or 50 percent of actual price to users from 
designated poorer households and freely distributed at no cost to homeless users.  Such subsidies provide 
a more reliable and lucrative source of income for the poorest households than was previously available, 
as members may buy forest products such as fuelwood at a low rate and then sell them at market for a 
substantially higher price (Bhatterai 2009).  
Community forestry funds have been used for wide-ranging infrastructure and community 
development projects that have improved market accessibility for remote villages (Table 6). Infrastructure 
projects supported by CFUGs include building or blacktopping of roads and construction of bridges, 
small-scale irrigation systems, drinking water systems, training centers, and guest houses. Many CFUGs 
in Nepal have used their funds to support the education infrastructure by providing funds for teachers’ 
salaries, school construction, furniture, scholarships, nutritional enhancement, forest excursions, and 
cultural programs.  
Table 6. Ongoing CFUG activities in Koshi Hills, 2008/09 
Activity  No. of 
CFUGs 
No. of households benefitting 
Income-generating activities (IGAs): 
     Revolving Fund 
     Community Forestry land allocation 









Health and sanitation activities  23  177 
Improved cooking stove construction and distribution  26  177         (82% are poor households) 
Drinking water schemes  167  12,480   (68% are poor households) 
Irrigation canal construction and maintenance   41  7,217     (65% are poor households) 
Trail / road maintenance to improve market access   297  NA 
Support to school teacher remuneration  67  NA 
Electrification projects  10  907        (52% are poor households) 
Wooden bridge construction  5  NA 
Office building construction   30  NA 
Tourism-related activities  5  NA 
Source: Chapagain and Banjade 2009.  
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Savings, credit, and microenterprise schemes developed by CFUGs have also made substantial 
contributions to household livelihoods in some districts in the country, and these are often targeted to 
benefit the poorest households. Among the most innovative cases are those that provide housing services 
to the poorest landless households. Although microfinance is currently a relatively uncommon use of 
CFUG funds, it may be one of the most promising options for future livelihood improvements stemming 
from community forestry (Dev et al. 2003; McDougall et al. 2008). For example, 312 CFUGs in Parbat 
District implemented savings and credit activities through which they mobilized more than NRs 
5,800,000 ($74,935 or $240 per CFUG) and supported more than 2,100 poor, marginalized, Dalit,
9
In LFP areas, 4,500 CFUGs from 15 of the 75 districts of Nepal raised more than NRs 120 
million ($1,521,227, or an average of about $345 per CFUG) from forest and nonforest resources and 
spent about 70 percent of that income on activities to enhance local livelihoods: 27 percent on forest 
management, 34 percent on social development activities, 18 percent on pro-poor provisions and 21 
percent on institutional development of the groups (Chapagain, Subedi, and Rana 2009). They estimate 
that CFUGs spent about NRs 14.4 million on poverty- focused actions during one year in the 15 districts. 
During 2007–08, these CFUGs generated paid local employment equivalent to NRs 180 million (1.5 
million person days). Out of the total employment, 19 percent was for Dalits and 31 percent for women. 
Overall, 85 percent of employees were from poor households.  
 and 
conflict-affected households (Luintel, Ojha, and Rana 2009). A total of 14,213 households in the Rapti 
region benefited from microenterprises developed through community forestry, and 94 percent of those 
households were from a poor or marginalized group (Luintel, Ojha, and Rana2009).  
Data from the Livelihoods and Forestry Programme of Nepal shows that Dalit representation in 
forest user group executive committees was about 6 percent until 2003, increasing to almost 15 percent by 
the end of 2007, on par with the overall percentage of Dalits in the 15 program districts of the LFP (Table 
7) (Chapagain, Subedi, and Rana 2009). Similarly, the representation of disadvantaged ethnic minorities 
has also increased from 32 percent in 2003 to 44 percent in 2008. The representation of the economically 
poor in CFUG decisionmaking committees during the period has also increased from 31 percent to 52 
percent.  
Table 7. Representation of ethnic people in executive committees of CFUGs 
Caste/ethnicity  % of national population  CFUG representation in 
2003 
CFUG representation in 
2008 
Dalits  12.3
a  6%  12% 
Ethnic minorities  29.9
b  32%  44% 
Muslims  3.6  0%  1% 
Women    21%  36% 
Poor    31%  52% 
Sources: Chapagain, Subedi, and Rana 2009; 
a Gurung 1996; 
b CBS 2002. 
Gender-Specific Dimensions 
Women comprise about 25 percent of executive committee positions within CFUGs (Kanel and Kandel 
2004) but are still struggling to rise to decisionmaking positions in the community forestry sphere 
(Nightingale 2002; Timsina 2002). One strategy toward balancing gender distribution has been to form 
women-only CFUGs. Luintel and Timsina (2008) report that women-only CFUGs are generally provided 
with relatively small and marginal land as community forests. These CFUGs have access to forest only 
half the size per household of mixed CFUGs (0.34 ha for women-only CFUGs, compared with 0.73 ha for 
mixed CFUGs) (Rai-Paudyal and Buchy 2004). Another initiative for balancing gender has been to 
                                                       




include the names of women in the CFUG member list, instead of the earlier practice of including only 
the male household head. Although gender concerns have long been ignored in community forestry 
(Buchy and Subba 2003), Luintel and Timsina (2008) suggest a rising trend of women’s participation in 
community forestry. An analysis of minutes of assemblies and meetings of 11 CFUGs that they studied 
shows that representation by women, including Dalits, has increased over time (Table 8).  
Table 8. Increasing trend of women’s representation on CFUG executive committees over time   
CFUG  Executive Committee 
composition at time of 
formation 
Composition between first and 
current Executive Committee 
Current composition 
Women   Men   Women   Men   Women   Men  
Dangsera  4  6  11  2  5  6 
Tham   0  9  2  9  2  9 
Byangdhunga  NA  NA  1  5  5  6 
Mathillo Patle  0  8  1  10  2  9 
Pandey  NA  NA  NA  NA  2  5 
Kagbeni FMSC  0  9  0  9  0  9 
Kalo Ban FMSC  NA  NA  NA  NA  1  6 
Sarbodaya  0  11  5  9  5  6 
Nashawa  4  11  4  11  5  10 
Kamalpur  5  14  0  15  11  4 
Chautari  2  9  0  10  5  8 
Total  15  77  24  80  43  78 
Note: NA is not available. 
Source: Luintel and Timsina 2008. 
Women’s presence in CFUG meetings and assemblies is often constrained by their sociocultural 
roles in society as well as their limited prior deliberative experience (Luintel and Timsina 2008; 
Nightingale 2002). However, in recent years, greater participation of women—both in quantity and 
quality—has been observed in areas where women’s ability to make choices is relatively independent at 
the household level. Many women-only CFUGs are operating successfully, and Community Forestry 
Program actors clearly prioritize gender-related goals. Moreover, when women have greater access to 
financial assets through various activities, such as income generation and savings and credit, the family 
benefits from women’s participation in the public domain. 
Controversial or Unintended Negative Aspects 
Livelihoods have benefited from community forestry in Nepal, although some controversial aspects serve 
as the basis for ongoing research, critique, and innovation to further strengthen and adapt the program. 
Controversial aspects include insufficient quantitative evidence of an improvement in the income 
component of livelihoods, particularly for the poorest households and marginalized groups; divergent 
viewpoints over long-term community forestry management goals; a too-tenuous policy and enabling 
environment for pro-poor management; land tenure insecurity, especially for the poorest and marginalized 
groups; and difficulties in implementing community forestry in the timber-rich Terai region of the 
country. 
First, perhaps the most prominent of these aspects is evidence that the poorest households, who 
are the primary focus of pro-poor development interests, appear to benefit less from community forestry 
than wealthier households in a community. Some studies have found that wealthier households not only 
tend to control forest management decisions, but also may make access to forest products  
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disproportionately more difficult for poorer households by making management decisions that act in their 
own interests. Examples include focusing management efforts on timber production, restricting the 
amount of NTFP collection, introducing fee-based collection systems, and reducing access to CFUG 
funds by other members of the group (Pokharel and Nurse 2004; Dhakal, Bigsby, and Cullen 2005).  
Other studies show quantitatively that the poorest households in the communities studied, who do 
not have enough land to support their basic subsistence needs and are thus more reliant on forest products 
than other community members, receive disproportionately smaller livelihood benefits from community 
forestry than the wealthier households (Malla 2000; Adhikari, DiFalco, and Lovett 2004; Dhakal, Bigsby, 
and Cullen 2007). Certain forest products, such as timber, are too expensive for nonwealthy households to 
afford, even with subsidies. One suggestion for overcoming this “hidden subsidy” (Iversen et al. 2006) is 
to shift primary management priorities in community forests away from timber production, while 
increasing the emphasis on fodder production and agroforestry (Dhakal, Bigsby, and Cullen 2005, 2007). 
Since timber permits and harvesting fees are out of reach for many of the poorer households in a 
community, another suggestion is to increase the focus on NTFPs as sources of revenue (Kanel and 
Kandel 2004). Other studies of community forestry situations report a decline in the availability of 
fuelwood and fodder, no evidence of enhanced employment opportunities, little overall increase in 
household incomes or livestock resources, or a lack of livelihood improvement for the poorest households 
in a community (Dougill et al. 2001; Timsina 2003; Dhakal, Bigsby, and Cullen 2007; Shrestha and 
McManus 2008; Maharjan et al. 2009).    
Second, some reviews have called for a stronger enabling policy framework to promote pro-poor 
forest management in Nepal (Acharya, Adhikari, and Khanal 2008; Bhatterai 2009).  One strategy for this 
could be to lease out parts of community forest land to the poorest groups for short-term cash crop 
cultivation or agroforestry, but community forestry legislation does not allow the planting of annual crops 
on community forest land.
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Third, as the LFP experience demonstrates (Bhattarai 2009; Kunwar, Neil, Paudyal and Subedi 
2009), land tenure security remains a critical issue in relation to providing sustained incentives to the poor 
to invest in the forest land allocated to them. In the land allocation schemes, tenure is currently defined 
through an agreement between a poor household (or group of households) and the CFUG committee, but 
there is no regulatory provision to facilitate and provide legal security to such pro-poor transactions. 
Given that there is high demand for forest land among households of all wealth categories, Bhattarai 
(2009) fears that community-level agreements with poor and excluded groups may easily revert back 
under local pressures and politics. We agree that pro-poor innovation is sustainable over the long run only 
when there are strong institutional mechanisms built in favor of the poor at village and higher levels. The 
current political transition is full of inclusion and restructuring agendas, and some of the deeper structural 
issues of exclusion around forest and natural resource management are being articulated in the national 
politics and the constitutional debate (Himal 2009).  
 Poor users are encouraged by DFO staff to plant forest or wild crops that are 
not always preferred by the poor or compatible with their requirements. Studies such as Bhattarai (2009) 
and Paudel, Banjade, and Dahal (2009) report a widespread perception among community forest users 
that the government retains overall forest management authority while simply shedding the responsibility 
for day-to-day management of forests to local communities.  
Lastly, there has also been much controversy over the implementation of community forestry in 
the Terai region of Nepal and conflict with another competing program called Collaborative Forest 
Management (Bampton, Banjade, and Ebregt 2008). The commercial value of forests in the Terai greatly 
exceeds that of the middle hills, because Terai forests are dominated by hardwood timber tree species. 
Terai forests therefore have the potential to generate much greater revenues for CFUGs than middle hills 
forests, but they are also a much higher potential source of revenue for the state. The presence of products 
of high commercial value in Terai forests creates greater conflict over forest resource access, benefits 
distribution, and overall Community Forestry Program implementation. It also prompts concerns that the 
                                                       
10 Section 49 under article 11 of the Forest Act clearly states that no person shall attempt to deforest, plough, dig, or 
cultivate the land in a forest area.   
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institutional model for community forestry in the middle ills may need to be substantially altered if it is to 
succeed in avoiding elite capture or state appropriation of benefits in the Terai (Iversen et al. 2006).   
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4.  SUSTAINABILITY OF COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN NEPAL 
As mentioned earlier, community forestry in Nepal is not entirely an external intervention. It is indeed a 
negotiated process of forest governance between local communities and the state, with additional 
developmental inputs from donor-funded programs and advisory and advocacy inputs from NGOs. Thus, 
when we refer to ”community forestry,” we do not merely mean a government program but a complex set 
of social-ecological interactions, involving local communities and their institutions, government policies 
and programs, and associated technical, institutional, and political processes at multiple levels, that affect 
forest management choices and actions of local people (Ojha, Agrawal, and Cameron 2009). From this 
perspective we argue that the question of sustainability should not be focused on external intervention but 
should concentrate on local processes and then move up the scale to examine the effects of wider 
contextual drivers. Likewise, sustainability analysis should not be confined to sustainability of the 
government program inputs. Sustainability is not understood merely as net present value of a stream of 
economic benefits but also as a sense of place and belonging to a community, social identity and power 
relations, social capital and civic engagement, and local worldviews and knowledge. Seen from these 
perspectives, community forestry in Nepal largely appears to be moving along a sustainable trajectory.  
As we outlined in section 2, community forestry processes have continuously expanded over the 
past three decades – in terms of the number of CFUGs formed, area of forest handed over to community 
management, and the number of households/families involved. During this period, the level of 
involvement of donors and government organizations has shrunk, while the involvement of NGOs and 
CFUG networks has expanded. The space for decentralization and community participation in natural 
resource management has partly been strengthened by the parallel processes of political mobilization and 
growing consciousness of people in Nepal about self-governance and democratization. Above all, the 
immediate livelihood benefits derived by rural households—as an input to agriculture, food security, and 
cash incomes—are the keys to strong collective action within local communities, allowing them to 
actively manage their forest resources.  
Community forestry is sustained by a legally defined tenurial structure that is well accepted by 
local communities and wider Community Forestry Program stakeholders. Radical community rights 
activists do not demand change in the legal system, unlike many other contexts, but monitor changes in 
the existing legal framework that may impinge on community rights.  While issues of tenure and power 
sharing between local communities and the government are legalized and provide secure tenure rights to 
local communities, there are sometimes tensions between local communities and the government in 
defining, interpreting, and enacting these formally agreed rights (Shrestha 2001; Ojha 2006). This tension 
sometimes overflows in street protests or intense negotiations, cultivating a feeling of instability and 
confusion over tenurial security even as it strengthens the claims of local communities. The recurrent 
issue is the extent to which processes of policymaking, program planning, and implementation provide 
opportunities to local community groups and civil society networks to influence forest governance. The 
debate is not so much about principles or legal arrangements, but at the level of everyday practice, where 
actors seek to defend or maximize their self-interests. This is particularly serious when it comes to 
registering CFUGs, planning forest management, and harvesting and marketing forest products from 
community forests. Table 9 summarizes key risks and opportunities related to the long-term sustainability 
of the Community Forestry Program in Nepal. It lists some real risks but also identifies numerous 
opportunities that are available to community forestry actors to deepen the sustainability of community 
forestry in Nepal.  
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Table 9. An analysis of risks and opportunities related to sustainability of the Nepal Community 
Forestry Program 
  Risks  Opportunities for 
Financial   •  Market for NTFPs lower than anticipated 
due to global financial crisis and other 
market uncertainties  
•  Financial dependency of CFUG networks on 
external donors  
•  Nontransparent financial transactions in 
timber marketing  
•  Diversion of forest incomes to community 
development activities and limited 
investment in forest development  
•  Overreliance of government Community 
Forestry Program on donors  
•  enhancing enterprise management and marketing skills 
of CFUGs  
•  combining multiple CFUGs at the landscape level to 
realize the economy of scale in forest products 
marketing  
•  mobilizing CFUG paid levies to sustain network 
activities and reduce dependency on donors  
•  enhancing cash benefits through the cultivation of cash 
crops in degraded parts of forest land 
•  CFUGs becoming financially self-sustainable and 
having the potential to cover government expenses 
through tax (if a political decision can be made through 
consensus) 
Environmental   •  Impact of climate change – species range 
shift, forest fire, etc.  
•  Increased forest fire and wildlife damage to 
human life and property may reduce the 
incentives for forest management 
•  Preference for certain species while 
undertaking forestry operations may lead to 
unsustainable species composition and loss of 
biodiversity  
•  Growing economic opportunity for 
nonforestry use of the forest land may prompt 
CFUGs to convert forests into unsustainable 
land use practices (such as construction of 
buildings, roads, etc.)  
•  added incentives through carbon markets may reinforce 
forest conservation  
•  accounting of ecosystem services of community forests 
may reinforce forest conservation through added 
recognition and incentives  
•  CFUGs to increasingly recognize the biodiversity 
outcomes of forest management  
•  community participation to enhance forest condition and 
biodiversity, compared to government management of 
forests  
Socio-political   •  CFUGs may face disincentives if there is 
continued domination by techno-bureaucrats 
•  Decisionmaking within CFUGs may continue 
to be dominated by local elites  
•  Federation and CFUG networks that enhance 
the agenda of local communities at national 
and international level are heavily donor 
dependent  
•  Political parties may seek to influence 
CFUGs and their networks through non-
transparent and undemocratic manner  
•  Changes in political system may minimize 
the role of civil society and local 
communities 
•  Conflict with alternative models of 
community-based forest management such as 
leasehold forestry and collaborative forest 
management  
•  a growing number of government foresters to  support 
the principle of community participation in forest 
management  
•  emergence of a strong network of CFUGs influencing 
policies at national and international levels 
•  A strong network of NGOs and professional knowledge 
producers to promote participatory forestry  
•  strong support to and recognition of community forestry 
by political parties  
•  extensive network of community forestry activists 
throughout the country.  
•  International Labor Organization Convention number 
169 empowering the indigenous and local forest 
communities to claim greater rights over forest  
Economic/Financial Sustainability 
Nepal’s Community Forestry Program is still largely a part of its subsistence livelihood system, with 
nonmonetary transactions dominating forest management. Due to the absence of any rapid expansion of 
capitalist production in rural areas of Nepal (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2002), the opportunity cost of  
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labor is low, which makes it possible to generate the substantial voluntary contributions needed to 
undertake forest management. Local actors choose to contribute their time and labor largely because 
forests represent a sociopolitical arena for them to engage in cultural and political exchanges, allowing 
them to further shape the collective identity of a community. In recent years, local forest-dependent 
people are becoming increasingly conscious of civil, political, and economic rights, and marginalized 
groups such as Dalits and indigenous groups are seeking pro-active involvement in different spheres of 
forest governance. Clearly, participating in forest management is not only driven by economic benefits 
but by a variety of cultural, symbolic, and political benefits that are gained through collective action in the 
forest governance arena (Ojha, Agrawal, and Cameron 2009).  
We summarize anecdotal indications of the emerging economic sustainability of the program 
here, in the absence of a reliable cost-benefit analysis of the community forestry intervention, noting an 
increasing expectation of cash benefits from market transactions, such as through the sale of timber and 
nontimber forest products, to meet the growing livelihood needs of forest-dependent communities 
(Banjade and Paudel 2009). Depending on the location of a community forest, timber and several high 
value nontimber forest products have good local and international markets. Timber in the low-lying Terai 
and medicinal plants of the higher Himalaya are well known. These products have emerged as a source of 
cash incentives to local communities. In recent years, there are attempts to increase the capacity of 
CFUGs to promote enterprise-oriented use of forests (Subedi 2006). Despite growing evidence of the 
positive role of economic incentives in forest conservation, through small-scale forestry enterprises, the 
policy environment is still too restrictive to support and encourage enterprise-oriented management of 
community forests (Banjade and Paudel 2009; Kunwar et al. 2009).  
  The nature of household dependence on forests is also changing, and the direction of change 
varies across different contexts. In areas where out-migration is common, people’s dependence on forests 
has decreased for two reasons: increased access to cash income from distant nonfarm sources and a 
decline in the supply of active human resources. This may lead to reduced pressure on forests. In other 
contexts such as the Terai, where the land is fertile and there is still a large area of de jure government 
forest under de facto open access, forest in-migration has continued. This has created added pressure on 
forest land. There are instances of squatters organizing as a CFUG and managing forests in a sustainable 
way (Pokharel 2000), as well as incidents of squatters confronting a CFUG over land for settlements. 
Such conflicts are highly politicized, and CFUGs and their federations have had to face tremendous 
pressure from political interests. CFUGs have also organized themselves to protect forests and community 
forestry.  
In the emerging context of climate change, once again, the perceived value of forest land is 
growing compared with competing land uses. The government of Nepal and other stakeholders are 
conducting pilot programs exploring the possibilities of forest carbon marketing from community 
forestry. A separate government unit has been established within Nepal’s Ministry of Forest and Soil 
Conservation to deal with the issues of forest and climate change. Given that the global forest sector 
contributes to one-fifth of global greenhouse emissions through deforestation and degradation (Stern 
2006), there is a possibility that carbon revenue may provide added incentives for community 
participation in forest management (LFP 2009). But there are also fears that the emergence of carbon 
forestry may trigger a reversal of forest tenure reform, potentially undermining the rights of local 
communities under community forestry (Dahal and Banskota 2009).  
After three decades in place, studies indicate that community forestry may be more effective than 
government management from a financial point of view. Kanel (2004) argues that, based on a study 
conducted in 2002,  the annual income of the Department of Forests, which controls 75 percent of Nepal’s 
forest area, is about NRs 680 million, while the income of CFUGs, which control 25 percent of the forest 
area, is NRs 740 million per year. CFUGs are still found to be earning less than they could under a 
sustainable use approach to forest management, with estimated earnings far less than expected from an 
economic perspective (Niraula 2004b). This resonates with the widely held view that community forests 
are protection-oriented and underutilized (Pokharel et al. 2008).   
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Despite apparently greater efficiency than government management, community forestry in its 
own right has yet to be managed effectively. Since per capita forest area in the middle hills is relatively 
low (for example, 0.5 ha per household in Ramechhap and Dolakha districts), management and utilization 
need to be brought to the highest sustainable level (Nurse et al. 2004). The current harvesting level is less 
than 1 percent of the growing stock (Pokharel et al. 2008). This is again related mainly to techno-
bureaucratic control over forest management planning and the lack of a service delivery system that is 
independent of bureaucratic control.  
In the initial stage, and to some extent up until the present, community forestry has been largely a 
donor-funded process, and some argue that it is somewhat unclear how financial support for the program 
will continue as donor funds are scaled back (Acharya 2002; Pokharel et al. 2008). Donor support for the 
Community Forestry Program, which covers up to 16 percent of CFUG costs, is currently unsustainable, 
even after 30 years of implementation. But we argue that this is indeed a governance problem and not a 
financial constraint, mainly because the local community forestry processes have built sufficient 
momentum in Nepal, demonstrating the willingness of local communities to make the investments 
necessary to establish and operate CFUGs. Moreover, the CFUGs have been able to generate a substantial 
amount of funds even under a protectionist approach to forest management, indicating a potential for 
meeting overhead costs more fully through increased production-based community forestry. If CFUGs 
believe in the credibility of the Community Forestry Program and own it, and if the government’s role is 
limited to regulation and technical support, so that private and nongovernmental service providers are 
allowed to work directly with CFUGs in other areas of service delivery, then the cost of the Community 
Forestry Program will be low enough to be covered by a levy on community forestry production itself. 
But to date, CFUGs and their networks are opposed to paying any extra tax to the government, and this 
should be seen in the context of the limited credibility and legitimacy of the government.  
Another set of evidence for financial sustainability of community forestry in Nepal is that in 
several districts, community forestry has become functional and perhaps more effective in areas where 
there has been little or no donor program support. This is the case in Terai districts in general (Dhungana 
and Bhattarai 2005) and several hill districts outside of bilateral project areas. CFUGs are also becoming 
part of subnational, national, and international networks, gaining greater access to information and 
institutional development services. After the mid-1990s, civil society groups have taken much of the 
responsibility for expanding community forestry.  
Lastly, a key issue for financial sustainability at the CFUG level is equity in sharing forest 
products and related pricing mechanisms. Recognizing the hidden subsidy (Iversen et al. 2006) accruing 
to local elites, many CFUGs have begun to adopt differential rates for households with different wealth 
statuses. Still, wealthier households may make more effective use of benefit quotas that poor households 
cannot capitalize on, for instance timber benefits. The issue is whether forest products should gradually be 
sold at market prices, either within or outside the group, to maximize financial revenue that is then used to 
support the livelihoods of the poor in ways that really suit their needs.  
Environmental Sustainability 
No comprehensive studies are available to assess the environmental outcomes of community forestry, but 
both case studies and general observations suggest improvement in forest conditions (for example, lower 
incidence of fire and illegal harvesting of various forest products, better controlled grazing, higher tree 
density in formerly degraded forests, increased species diversity, and regeneration of important species 
(Dougill et al. 2001; Dongol, Hughey, and Bigsby 2002;, Acharya 2002; Dev et al. 2003; Yadav et al. 
2003).  
Amidst growing concern about the negative environmental impacts of development activities, the 
government of Nepal has also developed Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) / Initial Environmental 
Examination (IEE) guidelines. A similar instrument developed by the Ministry of Forest and Soil 
Conservation outlines EIA procedures for transferring forests to the Community Forestry Program and for 
undertaking forestry operations. However, this instrument was developed with limited participation or  
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inputs by the CFUGs federations and has been opposed by CFUGs and their organizations. Given the 
dissatisfaction on the part of CFUGs, such instruments of sustainability may ironically have negative 
effects, if imposed without involvement of the intended targets.  
At the level of CFUG management, the issue of forest ecological sustainability is strongly 
addressed. Forests are generally put under a protectionist regime immediately after a CFUG is formed, 
and harvesting is generally done on the basis of block-based management and in combination with an 
inventory and assessment of mean annual increment. Community forest users also often patrol forests in 
groups both day and night to protect forests from external free riders.  
Several studies suggest that there have been improvements in forest conditions, forest land uses, 
and biodiversity following community management. Branney and Yadav (1998) assess the change in 
condition of community forests between 1994 and1998 in four districts of the Koshi Hills. They find that 
the number of stems increased by 51 percent and basal area increased by 29 percent, whereas grazing 
intensity declined from 94 to 74 percent, compared with public forest. Karna, Gyawali, and Karmacharya 
(2004) analyze the  condition of five community forests at five-year intervals during 1993–2003 and find 
that several parameters of forest condition such as tree and sapling density and sapling diameter increased 
with the subsequent measurements.  
Gautam et al. (2003) analyze changes in land use in a watershed covering an area of 153 square 
kilometres (km
2), by comparing satellite imagery from 1976, 1989, and 2000. They find that the number 
of forest patches declined over time (from 395 in 1976 to 323 in 1989 and to 175 in 2000), while the 
average patch area increased over the same periods. This is attributed to the merger of previously isolated 
small forest patches, as previously degraded areas regenerated or came under forest plantation under 
community forestry. They also find that although 22.5 percent of forest area was converted to other land 
use during 1976–2000, 37.4 percent of land under other uses came under forestry during the same time 
period, resulting in a net increase of 14.9 percent in forest area in the watershed. A land use change study 
in two central districts, using aerial photographs from 1978 and 1992 along with rapid field assessment, 
finds that the area of forest land increased from 7,677 ha to 9,679 ha (37.5 percent) over the period 
assessed (Jackson et al. 1998). The authors attribute the increase primarily to forest plantation 
establishment as well as some increase in the area of mixed natural forest.  
Nagendra et al. (2008) use Landsat imagery from 1989 and 2000 to analyze changes in land cover 
in three management zones (government control, buffer zone around protected area, and community 
forestry), using landscape ecology metrics and proportional distribution of land cover categories. The 
results show significant differences in terms of land cover dynamics and landscape spatial patterns 
between these land ownership classes and suggest greater improvement of forests managed under 
community-based institutions. Another study compiles data from 55 forests from the middle hills and 
Terai plains of Nepal to examine factors associated with forest clearing or regeneration. Results affirm the 
central importance of tenure regimes and local monitoring, including participation of forest users in the 
management processes (Nagendra 2007).  
At both the subnational and national levels, a continuing issue is a lack of comprehensive 
monitoring. The Community Forestry Division of the Department of Forests does have a National 
Community Forestry Database, but it contains insufficient biodiversity information and is not updated 
with sufficient frequency. Data generated by donor projects are specific to project areas, and the ability to 
collate similar information across projects is limited because each project collects data that are most 
relevant to their particular interests. More recently, schemes of forest certification have been introduced 
by adapting global lessons and methodologies (NFA 2007). But these are popular among CFUGs, partly 
because certification is not yet linked to enhanced commercial benefits. Some analysis suggests that 
biodiversity and community governance are related: if diverse views and preferences regarding forest 
management are accommodated in the CFUG decisionmaking, there is a greater likelihood of favorable 
biodiversity outcomes (Banjade 2008).  
25 
 
Social and Political Sustainability 
At the wider level, community forestry has been heralded as a success, though issues of inclusion and 
management effectiveness remain important challenges, even though they have improved since the early 
years of implementation. Emergence of strong civil society institutions to promote community forestry 
has politically deepened the community forestry process, beyond the technical and largely apolitical 
approach adopted by government extension agents. CFUGs have organized themselves into strong 
networks such as FECOFUN and have shown themselves in the national arena to be politically mobilized 
actors, even participating in street protests defying the King’s takeover of power in 2006, in which many 
FECOFUN activists were detained by the royal regime (G. Pandey, personal communication 8 July 
2009). Today, CFUG networks are part of every policy debate that affects local forests and people. 
Because of this social and political mobilization, political parties strongly support community forestry in 
particular and decentralization of natural resource management in general. For this reason, community 
forestry appears to be a viable institution even during periods of conflict (Banjade and Timisina 2005; 
Pokharel, Ojha, and Paudel 2005). Nevertheless, political interests can overwhelm local dynamics, as 
when political parties seek to influence elections of CFUG federations (Ojha et al. 2008).  
At the level of discourse and knowledge, the mobilization around community forestry has 
challenged the traditional hegemony of a techno-bureaucratic ideology. Scholars from multiple disciplines 
have taken a keen interest in community forestry as it relates to biodiversity, livelihoods, and policy. Such 
scholarship has contributed to deliberative engagement between multiple stakeholders. Noted 
international scholars in the social and environmental sciences have undertaken case studies of Nepal, 
thus promoting the discourse of devolution globally. This is considered parallel with the culture of 
collaborative policymaking (such as national workshops every five years and regular multistakeholder 
policy deliberation groups) on the part of government officials. Lessons from the successful CFUGs are 
being scaled up in other sectors.  
A critical issue affecting the political sustainability of community forestry is how the relationship 
between CFUGs and the Forest Department is structured and transformed. Despite some changes in 
attitude and behavior of the forest officials toward working with local communities, largely as a result of 
the community forestry movement in the hills, the orthodox image of forest bureaucrats has not changed 
much (Ojha 2006; Pokharel, Ojha, and Paudel 2005). Power differentials between local people and 
foresters continue to be large, and ordinary citizens and forest bureaucrats still have problems of mutual 
mistrust, with limited opportunities of direct deliberative engagement. The majority of foresters still 
attach great value to what can only be labeled as techno-bureaucratic approaches.  
Overall, the strong interest of local communities in forest governance and their adoption of a 
sustainable approach to forest management are the key foundations of sustainability of community 
forestry in Nepal. CFUG networks and civil society actors have challenged the top-down approach of 
government. Community forestry is well respected by political parties, despite some strategic influences 
by politicians, for instance over CFUG elections. CFUGs have become durable institutions supported by 
an active and vibrant network of CFUG federations, all contributing to the sociopolitical sustainability of 
community forestry in Nepal.   
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5.  LESSONS 
The Community Forestry Program in Nepal demonstrates an innovation in citizen participation in forest 
governance from community-level forest management to national-level policymaking, as well as a range 
of cross-sectoral development institutions. It is characterized by a legally specified tenurial arrangement 
for community groups to manage and utilize forests, whereby well-established networks of civil society, 
social movements, researchers, and government agencies pursue diverse agendas within community 
forestry, often with conflicting objectives. The emergence of such a complex, multiscale system of 
governance was triggered in the late 1970s when key forest policymakers and government officials 
realized that it was not possible for the government to protect forests through the old fashioned, top-down, 
and state-centric approaches, without the active support of local people. At the same time, the perceived 
crisis of Himalayan degradation invited an international response in terms of technical expertise and 
financing that initially emphasized technical quick fixes, such as plantation establishment, but later  
allowed room for experimentation with different strategies, eventually reinforcing community-based 
forest management. Pilot studies and experimentation were critical aspects of the evolution of community 
forestry institutions and policy. The devolution of governance through community forestry has yielded 
both procedural and substantive gains. Procedural gains include democratic deliberation, civic 
engagement, capacity building, and institutional development. Substantive gains include creation of 
livelihood opportunities and contributions to forest ecological regeneration. By reviving the 
socioecological system of forest and rural landscapes, community forestry in Nepal has significantly 
improved livelihood systems. It has augmented not only natural capital flows but also nurtured a variety 
of livelihood capitals such as social, political, financial, and physical, through which local people have 
been better able to derive food and overall livelihood security.  
However, the case also demonstrates that the devolution policy does not guarantee participation 
of all. While participation of elite members of society has improved forest governance when compared 
with the state management of forests, the continuing challenge is to understand how marginalized 
members of society can have equitable access to benefits from community forestry. This is indeed a 
structural issue of Nepalese society that is characterized by multiple axes of hierarchy–caste, gender, 
ethnicity, class, and geographic isolation. More recently, community forestry in Nepal has been greatly 
mediated by swift political transitions in which marginalized groups are making historic claims of identity 
and participating in political change. A significant aspect of democratization and tenurial security is 
related to the interaction between local communities and forest bureaucracy, which has yet to fully 
transform itself from its colonial legacy of centralized forest management. The changing livelihood 
context is also affecting community forestry in various directions, including a shift toward commercial 
use of forest products.  
Below we identify various specific lessons in relation to implementation of the program, 
particularly as they relate to improved livelihoods and welfare. We also outline issues related to 
generating impact and present lessons for wider replications outside of Nepal.  
Key Lessons Learned in Implementing the Intervention 
Security of tenure played an important role in the success of community forestry in Nepal. CFUGs had 
clear standing under the 1993 law, which provided them with legal identity and a high degree of 
autonomy from arbitrary bureaucratic actions. This stands in stark contrast to similar initiatives in other 
countries, such as India, where community forestry groups are not protected by the law (Behera and Engel 
2006). This legal protection allowed CFUGs to continue to function through some very tough times, as 
during the decade-long Maoist insurgency in some parts of the country, as well as to sustain themselves in 
situations where the government was not responsive or even absent. Moreover, CFUG’s independent 
legal status has enabled them to seek out collaboration with any civil society or private-sector 
organization of their choice, rather than relying solely on the government forest department for diverse 
services.   
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During implementation, donors invested simultaneously in creating secondary-level federations 
of CFUGs and in capacity building of local and national NGOs. As a career in mainstream politics lost 
credence in the eyes of mid-career political activists, they entered the emerging civil society domain 
where they retained a political outlook and an activist orientation. Because of donor support, as well as 
endogenous civic renaissance, community forestry became a platform for all kinds of critical actors – 
researchers, activists, reformist government officials, and expatriates.  This investment paid rich 
dividends over time, as when CFUGs were able to intervene directly in national policy debates through 
FECOFUN, their national network. Besides facilitating horizontal learning and sharing, CFUG networks 
and NGOs were also instrumental in the expansion of community forestry to districts that were not 
targeted by donor projects, thus expanding the reach of the program and multiplying the benefits in terms 
of livelihoods improvement.  
Key Issues Related to Generating Impact through the Intervention 
Although the legal identity of CFUGs was enshrined in the 1993 law, there was a great deal of flexibility 
in the choice of institutional structure for each case. This made it possible to tailor the institutional 
modalities of community forestry in practice to suit the heterogeneity of local contexts across Nepal. At 
the national level, this allowed for the evolution of differences in the structure of CFUGs across the high 
hills, middle hills, and the Terai, for example. When it became clear that the institutional model of 
CFUGs that worked well in the middle hills was inappropriate for the Terai, there was enough flexibility 
to experiment with alternative institutional forms. Although the current modality for power-sharing 
between government and local communities remains contested, there is now enough experience with 
diverse modalities—including community, government, and some form of joint management—to inform 
better formulation of policy for the Terai as well.  
Even within local contexts, the law provided a great deal of autonomy for CFUGs to experiment 
with different institutional arrangements pertaining to a range of issues, including silvicultural practices, 
access to forest products, benefit sharing, and income generation. Coupled with the horizontal information 
sharing facilitated by secondary organizations and NGOs, CFUGs were able to learn from a wider base of 
experience and adapt innovative ideas to their needs, including those that enhanced their income-
generating opportunities and enabled greater contributions to household livelihoods.  
Through these processes, community forestry in Nepal moved beyond subsistence—fuelwood 
and fodder for domestic needs—to incorporate forests as a major source of household incomes. Forests 
not only contributed directly to rural livelihoods, but also became the source of investment capital and 
raw material for new market-oriented livelihoods. This diversification, enabled by CFUG incomes from 
improved forest management, increased household resilience to external shocks. After the initial period of 
consolidation, toward the end of the 1990s, community forestry also moved beyond forestry to focus on 
other  “second” and “third” generation issues (Britt 1998; Ojha et al. 2008). While forest management 
remained central to their identity, CFUGs chose to invest an increasing proportion of their incomes in 
social and physical infrastructure, thus providing public goods critical for livelihoods in particular and 
human development in general. In the context of widespread poverty and poor infrastructure, CFUG 
investments in education, health, and microcredit, besides roads, buildings, and small-scale irrigation, has 
created the basis for future improvements in rural livelihoods across large areas of Nepal.   
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Lessons for Replication 
Learning through experience is the key to success. Community forestry has evolved into a complex 
institutional network that requires actors to work collectively in a learning mode. Even when there is an 
absence of political consensus or a well-defined legal framework, collaborative learning has been able to 
find a way forward.  
Development of a strong civil society network is a critical part of community forestry success. Civil 
society influence over community forestry has remained critical in the post- 1990 political environment 
(following the advent of multiparty democracy), especially to safeguard community rights and ensure 
autonomy of community action from regressive government actions and intrusive private interests. 
Emergence of community federations at national and subnational levels has nurtured and promoted civic 
engagement in forest policymaking, defying the traditional top-down approaches. There is also significant 
empowerment of local citizens to participate in democratic governance.  
Diverse institutional modalities in practice should be allowed to emerge through flexible regulatory 
arrangements. Although conceived as a unified program of community forestry, diverse modalities have 
emerged in practice. CFUGs vary from a dozen households to several thousand, and the group structure 
varies from informal sharing and coordination mechanisms to highly formalized multitiered 
organizations. This is an adaptive response to the diversity of contexts.  
A technocratic and “interventionist” approach has given way to a collaborative learning process. The 
development of community forestry was in part triggered by the open and responsive attitude of 
government officials, and was followed by gradual development and institutionalization of a 
multistakeholder process of collaboration. Community forestry is no longer a government program alone 
or a foreign aid-driven activity, but a complex governance regime for a forest-dependent social-ecological 
system. Over time, community forestry has grown complex in terms of the range of actors involved, scale 
of resources mobilized, diversity of processes involving conflicts and collaboration, and policy and 
practical issues encountered. It has covered most of the middle hills of Nepal (one-third of the country’s 
population) and parts of the low-lying Terai and high hills. It stood resilient to the conflicts that plagued 
Nepal during 1996–2006.  
As some local specialists note, the Community Forestry Program of Nepal is  
…a now much enlarged sector compared with that which was originally envisaged, 
involving decentralised bodies (including district administrations), professional 
associations, the private sector, and the non-government sector as well as the original 
actors of government, donors and communities. Whereas previously projects and their 
government partners tended to pre-dominate the sector, nowadays many functions are 
taken on by other civil society actors with this trend continuing to the present. …. 
Community forestry in Nepal is now no longer limited by being a project or government 





Acharya, K. P. 2002. Twenty-four years of community forestry in Nepal. International Forestry Review 4: 149–156. 
Acharya, K. P., J. Adhikari, and D. R. Khanal. 2008. Forest tenure regimes and their impact on livelihoods in Nepal. 
Journal of Forest and Livelihood 7: 6–18. 
Adhikari, B., S. DiFalco, and J. C. Lovett. 2004. Household characteristics and forest dependency: Evidence from 
common property forest management in Nepal. Ecological Economics 48: 245–257. 
Adhikari, B., F. Williams, and J. C. Lovett. 2007. Local benefits from community forests in the middle hills of 
Nepal. Forest Policy and Economics 9: 464–478. 
Agrawal, A., and E. Ostrom. 2001. Collective action, property rights, and decentralization in resource use in India 
and Nepal. Politics and Society 29: 485–514. 
Arun, K. C. 2004. Extraction of NTFPs from the community forest: Analysis of benefit distribution pattern in 
household level. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 4: 38–43. 
Bampton, J. F. R., M. R. Banjade, and A. Ebregt. 2008. Collaborative forest management in Nepal's Terai: Policy, 
practice, and contestations. In Communities, forests and governance: Policy and institutional innovations 
from Nepal, ed. H. Ojha, N. Timsina, C. Kumar, B. Belcher, and M. Banjade. New Delhi: Adroit. 
Banjade, M., and N. Timsina. 2005. Impact of armed conflict in community forestry of Nepal. European Tropical 
Forest Research Network News 43–44: 81–83. 
Banjade, M. R. 2008. Community forestry and biodiversity conservation in Nepal: A critical analysis (in Nepali). In 
Biodiversity and livelihoods (in Nepali), ed. H. Dhungana and J. Adhikari. Chautari, Kathmandu, Nepal: 
Martin Chautari. 
Banjade, M. R., and N. S. Paudel. 2009. Economic potential of non-timber forest products in Nepal: Myth or 
potential. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 7 (1): 36–48. 
Banjade, M. R., H. Luintel, and H. R. Neupane. 2008. Action research experience on democratising knowledge in 
community forestry in Nepal. In Knowledge systems and natural resources, ed. H. Ojha, N. Timsina, R. 
Chhetri, and K. Paudel. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press/Foundation Books. 
Banjade, M. R., N. S. Paudel, H. Ojha, C. McDougall, and R. Prabhu. 2007. Conceptualising meso-level governance 
in the management of commons: Lessons from Nepal’s community forestry. Journal of Forest and 
Livelihood 6: 48–58. 
Banjade, M. R., N. P. Timsina, H. R. Neupane, K. Bhandari, T. Bhattarai, and S. K. Rana. 2006. Transforming 
agency and structure for facilitating pro-poor governance in community forestry. Journal of Forest and 
Livelihood 5: 22–33. 
Behera, B., and S. Engel. 2006. Institutional analysis of evolution of joint forest management in India: A new 
institutional economics approach. Forest Policy and Economics 8: 350–362. 
Bhattarai, B. 2007. What makes local elites work for the poor? A case of community forestry user group, Nepal. 
Paper prepared for an International Conference on Poverty Reduction and Forests: Tenure, Market, and 
Policy Reforms. Regional Community Forestry Training Center, Bangkok, Thailand.  
Bhattarai, S. 2009. Towards pro-poor institutions: Exclusive rights to the poor groups in community forest 
management. Discussion paper. ForestAction Nepal and Livelihoods and Forestry Program, Kathmandu, 
Nepal. 
Bhattarai, R. C., and S. P. Dhungana. 2008. Economic and market trends in forestry sector in Nepal. Thematic 
paper, ForestAction Nepal, Kathmandu, Nepal. Photocopy. 
Bk, N., R. K. Shrestha, S. Acharya, and A. S. Ansari. 2009. Maoist conflict, community forestry and livelihoods: 
Pro-poor innovations in forest management in Nepal. ForestAction Nepal, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Blaikie, P., J. Cameron, and D. Seddon. 2002. Understanding 20 years of change in west-central Nepal: Continuity 
and change in lives and ideas. World Development 30 (7): 1255–1270.  
30 
 
Branney, P., and K. P. Yadav. 1998. Changes in community forestry condition and management 1994–1998: 
Analysis of information from the forest resource assessment study and socio-economic study in the Koshi 
Hills, Nepal. Nepal UK Community Forestry Project, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Britt, C. 1998. Community forestry comes of age: Forest-user networking and federation-building experiences from 
Nepal. Paper presented at the biannual conference of the International Association for the Study of 
Common Property, Vancouver, Canada. 
Buchy, M., and S. Subba. 2003. Why is community forestry a social- and gender-blind technology? The case of 
Nepal. Gender, Technology and Development 3: 313–332, 
Cameron, J. 1998. Development thought and discourse analysis: A case study of Nepal. In New perspectives on 
India-Nepal relations, ed. K. Bahadur and M. L. Lama. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications. 
CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics). 2002. Statistical pocket book Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ramshah Path.  
Chapagain, B., R. Subedi, and B. Rana. 2009. Beyond elite capture: Community forestry contributes to pro-poor 
livelihoods in Nepal. Discussion paper. Livelihoods and Forestry Program, Kathmandu, Nepal. Photocopy. 
Chapagain, N., and M. R. Banjade. 2009. Community forestry as an effective institutional platform for local 
development: Experiences from the Koshi Hills. Kathmandu, Nepal: ForestAction Nepal and Livelihoods 
and Forestry Program (LFP). 
Chhetri, R. B. 2006. From protection to poverty reduction: A review of forestry policies and practices in Nepal. 
Journal of Forest and Livelihood 5: 66–77. 
Chhetri, R. B., and T. R. Pandey. 1992. User group forestry in the far-western region of Nepal: Case studies from 
Baitadi and Accham districts. International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Kathmandu. 
CIFOR (Center for International Forestry Research). 2007. Improving livelihoods and equity in community forestry: 
The role of adaptive collaborative management. Final technical report submitted to the International 
Development Research Center, Ottawa, Canada.  
DoF (Department of Forests). 2009. Community forestry database. Kathmandu, Nepal: DoF. 
Dahal, N., and K. Banskota. 2009. Cultivating REDD in Nepal’s community forestry: A discourse for capitalizing 
potential? Journal of Forest and Livelihood 8 (1): 41–50. 
den Hertog, W. H., and K. F. Wiersum. 2000. Timur (Zanthoxylum armatum) production in Nepal: Dynamics in 
nontimber forest resource management. Mountain Research and Development 20: 136–145. 
Dev, O. P., N. P. Yadav, O. Springate-Baginski, and J. Soussan. 2003. Impacts of community forestry on livelihoods 
in the middle hills of Nepal. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 3: 64–77. 
DFRS (Department of Forest Resources and Survey). 1999. The forest resources of Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: 
DFRS. 
Dhakal, B., H. Bigsby, and R. Cullen. 2005. Impacts of community forestry development on livestock-based 
livelihood in Nepal. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 4: 43–49. 
________. 2007. The link between community forestry policies and poverty and unemployment in rural Nepal. 
Mountain Research and Development 27: 32–39. 
Dongol, C. M., K. F. D. Hughey, and H. R. Bigsby. 2002. Capital formation and sustainable community forestry in 
Nepal. Mountain Research and Development 22: 70–77. 
Dougill, A. J., J. G. Soussan, E. Kiff, O. Springate-Baginski, N. P. Yadav, O. P. Dev, and A. P. Hurford. 2001. 
Impacts of community forestry on farming system sustainability in the Middle Hills of Nepal. Land 
Degradation and Development 12: 261–276. 
Eckholm, E. P. 1976. Losing ground: Environmental stress and world food prospects. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Fisher, R. J. 1989. Indigenous systems of common property forest management in Nepal. Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A.: 
Environment and Policy Institute.  
31 
 
Gautam, A. P., E. L. Webb, G. P. Shivakoti, and M. A. Zoebisch. 2003. Land use dynamics and landscape change 
pattern in a mountain watershed in Nepal. Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 99 (1–3): 83. 
Gilmour, D. A., and R. J. Fisher. 1991. Villagers, forests, and foresters: The philosophy, process, and practice of 
community forestry in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Sahayogi Press. 
Gronow, J., and N. K. Shrestha. 1991. From mistrust to participation—The creation of participatory environment for 
community forestry in Nepal. Overseas Development Institute Social Forestry Network Paper 12b. London, 
U.K.: ODI.  
Gurung, H. 1996. Ethnic demography of Nepal. Paper presented at the Nepal Foundation for Advanced Studies 
Conference, 10 January 1996, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Gutman, J. 1991. Representing crisis: The theory of Himalayan degradation and the project of development in Post-
Rana Nepal. Development and Change (28): 45–89. 
Hobley, M. 1996. Participatory forestry: The process of change in India and Nepal. Rural Development Forestry 
Network, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Himal. 2009. Hima News Magazine, May 31, 2009.  
Iversen, V., B. Chhetry, P. Francis, M. Gurung, G. Kafle, A. Pain, and J. Seeley. 2006. High-value forests, hidden 
economies, and elite capture: Evidence from forest user groups in Nepal’s Terai. Ecological Economics 58: 
93–107. 
Jackson, W. J., R. M. Tamrakar, S. Hunt, and K. R. Shepherd. 1998. Land-use changes in two Middle Hills districts 
of Nepal. Mountain Research and Development 18 (3): 193. 
Joshi, M., L. Dhakal, G. Paudel, R. Shrestha, A. Paudel, P. B. Chand, and N. P. Timsina. 2006. The livelihood 
improvement process: An inclusive and pro-poor approach to community forestry—Experiences from 
Kabhrepalanchok and Sindhupalchok districts of Nepal. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 5: 46–52. 
Kanel, B. R., and R. Subedi. 2004. Pro-poor community forestry: Some initiatives from the field. In Twenty-five 
years of community forestry, ed. K. Kanel, P. Mathema, B. R. Kandel, D. R. Niraula, A. Sharma, and M. 
Gautam. Proceedings of the Fourth National Workshop on Community Forestry. Kathmandu, Nepal: 
Department of Forests. 
Kanel, K. R. 2004. Twenty-five years of community forestry: Contributions to Millennium development goals. In 
Twenty-five years of community forestry, ed. K. Kanel, P. Mathema, B. R. Kandel, D. R. Niraula, A. 
Sharma, and M. Gautam. Proceedings of the Fourth National Workshop on Community Forestry. 
Kathmandu, Nepal: Department of Forests. 
Kanel, K. R., and D. Acharya. 2008. Re-inventing forestry agencies: Institutional innovation to support community 
forestry in Nepal. In Reinventing forestry agencies: Experiences of institutional restructuring in Asia and 
the Pacific, ed. P. Durst, C. Brown, J. Broadhead, R. Suzuki, R. Leslie, and A. Inoguchi. Bangkok: Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  
Kanel, K. R., and B. R. Kandel. 2004. Community forestry in Nepal: Achievements and challenges. Journal of 
Forest and Livelihood 4: 55–63. 
Karna, B. K., S. Gyawali, and M. Karmacharya. 2004. Forest condition change: Evidence from five revisited 
community forests. Paper prepared for the Fourth National Community Forestry Workshop, Department of 
Forests, Kathmandu, Nepal.  
Kumar, N. 2002. The challenges of community participation in forest development in Nepal. Operations Evaluation 
Department Working Paper No. 27931. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Kunwar, M., P. Neil, B. R. Paudyal, and R. Subedi. 2009. Securing rights to livelihoods through public land 
management: Opportunities and challenges. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 7 (1): 70–86. 
Kunwar, S. C., A. S. Ansari, and H. Luintel. 2009. Non-timber forest products enterprise development: Regulatory 
challenges experienced in the Koshi Hills of Nepal. Discussion paper. ForestAction Nepal and Livelihood 
and Forestry Program, Kathmandu, Nepal.   
32 
 
LFP (Livelihood and Forestry Program). 2008. Synthesis of LFP’s SFM activities. Kathmandu, Nepal. Photocopy. 
________. 2009. Can forest carbon financing benefit Nepal? A review of potential, challenges, and options. 
Kathmandu, Nepal: LFP. 
Luintel, H. 2006. Do civil society organizations promote equity in community forestry? A reflection from Nepal’s 
experiences. In Hanging on the balance: Equity in community-based natural resource management in Asia, 
ed. S. Mahanth, J. Fox, M. Nurse, and L. McLees. Bangkok, Thailand: East-West Centre and RECOFTC. 
Luintel, H., and N. Timsina. 2008. Is forestry decentralization effective in empowering women’s agency? 
ForestAction, Kathmandu, Nepal.  
Luintel, H., B. Bhattarai, and H. Ojha. 2006. Internal group governance in the context of community based forest 
management: A review of recent innovations and an analytical framework. ForestAction Nepal and 
Regional Community Forestry Training Center (RECOFTC), Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Luintel, H., H. R. Ojha, and B. Rana. 2009. Community forestry in Nepal: A synthesis of innovative practices. 
ForestAction Nepal and Livelihood Forestry Program, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Maharjan, M. R., T. R. Dhakal, S. K. Thapa, K. Schreckenberg, and C. Luttrell. 2009. Improving the benefits to the 
poor from community forestry in the Churia region of Nepal. International Forestry Review 11 (2): 254–
267. 
Malla, Y. B. 1997. Sustainable use of communal forests in Nepal. Journal of World Forest Resource Management 8 
(1): 51. 
________. 2000. Impact of community forestry policy on rural livelihoods and food security in Nepal. Unasylva 51 
(202): 37–45. 
Malla, Y. B., R. Barnes, K. Paudel, A. Lawrence, H. Ojha, and K. Green. 2002. Common property forest resource 
management in Nepal: Developing monitoring systems for use at the local level. Kathmandu, Nepal, and 
Reading, U.K.: ForestAction and The University of Reading. 
McDougall, C., H. Ojha, M. R. Banjade, B. H. Pandit, T. Bhattarai, M. Maharjan, and S. Rana. 2008. Forests of 
learning: Experiences from research on an adaptive collaborative approach to community forestry in Nepal. 
Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Metz, J. J. 1995. Development in Nepal: Investment in the status quo. Geographical Journal 35 (2): 175–184. 
MFSC (Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation). 1995. Forest Act 993 and Forest rules and regulations 1995. 
Kathmandu, Nepal: Government of Nepal. 
Nagendra, H. 2007. Drivers of reforestation in human-dominated forests. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 104 (39): 15218–15223. 
Nagendra, H., S. Pareeth, B. Sharma, C. M. Schweik, and K. R. Adhikari. 2008. Forest fragmentation and regrowth 
in an institutional mosaic of community, government and private ownership in Nepal. Landscape Ecology 
23 (1): 41–54. 
NFA (Nepal Foresters’ Association). 2007. Forest certification in Nepal: Practices and experience. Kathmandu, 
Nepal: NFA. 
Nightingale, A. J. 2002. Participating or just sitting in? The dynamics of gender and caste in community forestry. 
Journal of Forest and Livelihood 2: 17–24. 
Niraula, D. 2004a. Current status of recommendations made by the Third National Community Forestry Workshop. 
25 Years of Community Forestry, Department of Forests, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
________. 2004b. Integrating total economic value for enhancing sustainable management of community forests: A 
forward looking approach. Proceedings of the Fourth National Workshop on Community Forestry, 
Community Forestry Division, Department of Forests, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Nurse, M., H. Tembe, D. Paudel, and U. Dahal. 2004. From passive management to health and wealth creation from 
Nepal’s community forest. Proceedings of the Fourth National Workshop on Community Forestry, 
Community Forestry Division, Department of Forests, Kathmandu, Nepal.  
33 
 
Ojha, H. 2002. A critical assessment of scientific and political aspects of the issue of community forest inventory in 
Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: ForestAction. 
________. 2006. Techno-bureaucratic doxa and the challenges of deliberative governance—The case of community 
forestry policy and practice in Nepal. Policy and Society 25 (2): 131–175. 
________. 2008. Reframing governance: Understanding deliberative politics in Nepal's Terai forestry. New Delhi: 
Adroit. 
Ojha, H., and B. Pokharel. 2005. Democratic innovations in community forestry—What can politicians learn? 
Participation 7 (7): 22–25. 
Ojha, H., and N. Timsina. 2008. From grassroots to policy deliberation—The case of Federation of Forest User 
Groups in Nepal. In Knowledge systems and natural resources: Management, policy and institutions in 
Nepal, ed. H. Ojha, N. Timsina, R. Chhetri, and K. Paudel. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India 
and International Development Research Center.   
Ojha, H., C. Agrawal, and J. Cameron. 2009. Deliberation or symbolic violence? The governance of community 
forestry in Nepal. Forest Policy and Economics 11 (5–6): 365–374. 
Ojha, H., M. Khanal, and B. Shrestha. 1997. The process of handing over community forestry: The potential role of 
I / NGOs. National Workshop on Community Forestry for Rural Development, ActionAid Nepal, 
Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Ojha, H., K. Paudel, and J. Cameron. 2007. Autonomy or deliberative governance? Insights from Bourdieu, 
Habermas, and Dewey. In Autonomy beyond Kant and Hermeneutics, ed. P. Banarjee and S. K. Das. 
London, New Delhi, and New York: Anthem Books. 
Ojha, H., N. P. Timsina, and D. Khanal. 2007. How are forest policy decisions made in Nepal? Journal of Forest 
and Livelihood 6 (1): 1–16. 
Ojha, H. R., B. Subedi, H. Dhungana, and D. Paudel. 2008. Citizen participation in forest governance: Insights from 
community forestry in Nepal. Paper presented at the Conference on “Environmental Governance and 
Democracy,” May 10–11, 2008, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, U.S.A. 
Pandey, D. R. 1999. Nepal’s failed development: Reflections on the mission and maladies. Kathmandu, Nepal: 
South Asia Centre. 
Pandit, B. H., and G. B. Thapa. 2004. Poverty and resource degradation in Nepal. Society and Natural Resources 17: 
1–16. 
Paudel, K. P., and H. R. Ojha. 2008. Contested knowledge and reconciliation in Nepal’s community forestry: A case 
of forest inventory policy. In Knowledge systems and natural resources: Management, policy, and 
institutions in Nepal, ed. H. R. Ojha, N. P. Timsina, R. B. Chhetri, and K. P. Paudel. New Delhi: 
Cambridge University Press India and International Development Research Center. 
Paudel, K., K. Green, H. Ojha, and R. Barnes. 2007. Challenges to participation: Lessons from participatory action 
research with community forest user groups in Nepal. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 6: 70–78. 
Paudel, N. S., M. R. Banjade, and G. R. Dahal. 2008. Impacts of forest tenure reform on livelihoods: Experiences 
from Nepal. Paper presented at the International Association for the Study of the Commons annual 
conference, July 14–18 2008, Cheltenham, U.K. 
________. 2009. Handover of community forestry: A political decision or a technical process? Journal of Forest 
and Livelihoods 7 (1): 27–35 
Pokharel, B. K., and M. Nurse. 2004. Forests and people’s livelihood: Benefiting the poor from community forestry. 
Journal of Forest and Livelihood 4: 19–29. 
Pokharel, B. K., H. R. Ojha, and D. Paudel. 2005. Assessing development space and outcomes in conflict situation: 
A reflection from Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project. Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project, 
Kathmandu, Nepal.  
34 
 
Pokharel, B. K., P. Branney, M. Nurse, and Y. B. Malla. 2007. Community forestry: Conserving forests, sustaining 
livelihoods and strengthening democracy. Journal of Forest and Livelihood 6: 8–19. 
________. 2008. Community forestry: Conserving forests, sustaining livelihoods, strengthening democracy. In 
Communities, forests, and governance: policy and institutional innovations from Nepal, ed. H. Ojha, N. 
Timsina, C. Kumar, B. Belcher, and M. Banjade. New Delhi: Adroit.  
Pokharel, B. K., G. R. Dahal, and S. Byrne. 2009. Nepal country report on forest governance and climate change. 
Swiss Intercooperation, Kathmandu, Nepal.  
Pokharel, R. 2000. From practice to policy—Squatters as forest protectors in Nepal: An experience from Shrijana 
Forest User Group. Forests, Trees, and People Newsletter (42): 31–35. 
Rai-Paudyal, B., and M. Buchy. 2004. Institutional exclusion of women in community forestry: Is women-only 
strategy a right answer? In Proceedings of the Fourth National Workshop on Community Forestry. 
Kathmandu, Nepal: Community Forestry Division, Department of Forests.  
Regmi, M. C. 1978. Land tenure and taxation in Nepal. New Delhi: Adroit. 
Shrestha, K. K., and P. McManus. 2008. The politics of community participation in natural resource management: 
Lessons from community forestry in Nepal. Australian Forestry 71: 135–146. 
Shrestha, N. K. 2001. The backlash: Recent policy changes undermine user control of community forests in Nepal. 
Forest, Trees, and People Newsletter (44): 62–65. 
Shrestha, N. R. 1998. In the name of development: A reflection on Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Educational 
Enterprises, Ltd.  
Shrestha, R., S. L. Shrestha, S. G. Acharya, and S. Adhikari. 2009. Improving community level governance: 
Adaptive learning and action in community forest user groups. Kathmandu, Nepal: ForestAction Nepal and 
Livelihoods and Forestry Program. 
Stern, N. 2006. The Stern review: The economics of climate change, 2006. London: Government of the United 
Kingdom.  
Subedi, B. P. 2006. Linking plant-based enterprises and local communities to biodiversity conservation in Nepal 
Himalaya. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 
Timsina, N. 2002. Empowerment or marginalization: A debate in community forestry in Nepal. Journal of Forest 
and Livelihood 2: 27–33.  
Timsina, N. P. 2003. Promoting social justice and conserving montane forest environments: A case study of Nepal’s 
community forestry programme. Geographical Journal 169: 236–242. 
Yadav, N. P., O. P. Dev, O. Springate-Baginski, and J. Soussan. 2003. Forest management and utilization under 





IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
Prepared for the “Millions Fed: Proven Successes in Agricultural Development” 
910.  Combating stem and leaf rust of wheat: Historical perspective, impacts, and lessons learned.  H.  J.  Dubin and John P.  
Brennan, 2009.  
911.  The Asian Green Revolution.  Peter B.  R.  Hazell, 2009. 
912.  Controlling cassava mosaic virus and cassava mealybug in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Felix Nweke, 2009. 
913.  Community forestry in Nepal: A policy innovation for local livelihoods.  Hemant Ojha, Lauren Persha, and Ashwini 
Chhatre, 2009. 
914.  Agro-environmental transformation in the Sahel:  Another kind of “Green Revolution.”  Chris Reij, Gray Tappan, and 
Melinda Smale, 2009. 
915.  The case of zero-tillage technology in Argentina.  Eduardo Trigo, Eugenio Cap, Valeria Malach, and Federico Villarreal, 
2009. 
916.  Zero tillage in the rice-wheat systems of the Indo-Gangetic plains: A review of impacts and sustainability implications.  
Olaf Erenstein, 2009. 
917.  The impact of shallow tubewells and boro rice on food security in Bangladesh.  Mahabub Hossain, 2009. 
918.  Hybrid rice technology development: Ensuring China’s food security.  Jiming Li, Yeyun Xin, and Longping Yuan, 2009. 
919.  Pearl millet and sorghum improvement in India.  Carl E.  Pray and Latha Nagarajan, 2009. 
920.  Institutional reform in the Burkinabè cotton sector and its impacts on incomes and food security: 1996–2006.  Jonathan 
Kaminski, Derek Headey, and Tanguy Bernard, 2009. 
921.  Private sector responses to public investments and policy reforms: The case of fertilizer and maize market development in 
Kenya.  Joshua Ariga and T.  S.  Jayne, 2009. 
922.  The mungbean transformation: Diversifying crops, defeating malnutrition.  Subramanyan Shanmugasundaram, J.  D.  H.  
Keatinge, and Jacqueline d’Arros Hughes, 2009. 
923.  The global effort to eradicate rinderpest.  Peter Roeder and Karl Rich, 2009. 
924.  Rural and urban linkages: Operation Flood’s role in India’s dairy development.  Kenda Cunningham, 2009. 
925.  Rich food for poor people: Genetically improved tilapia in the Philippines.  Sivan Yosef, 2009. 
926.  “Crossing the river while feeling the rocks:” Incremental land reform and its impact on rural welfare in China.  John W.  
Bruce and Zongmin Li, 2009. 
927.  Land-tenure policy reforms: Decollectivization and the Doi Moi System in Vietnam.  Michael Kirk and Tuan Nguyen, 
2009. 
928.  Improving diet quality and micronutrient nutrition: Homestead food production in Bangladesh.  Lora Iannotti, Kenda 
Cunningham, and Marie Ruel, 2009. 
929.  Improving the proof: Evolution of and emerging trends in impact assessment methods and approaches in agricultural 







For all discussion papers, please go to www.ifpri.org/pubs/pubs.htm#dp. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge.  
 
 
    
 
    
 
 




2033 K Street, NW 




IFPRI ADDIS ABABA 
P. O. Box 5689 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Tel.: +251 11 6463215 
Fax: +251 11 6462927 
Email: ifpri-addisababa@cgiar.org 
IFPRI NEW DELHI 
CG Block, NASC Complex, PUSA 
New Delhi 110-012 India 
Tel.: 91 11 2584-6565 
Fax: 91 11 2584-8008 / 2584-6572 
Email: ifpri-newdelhi@cgiar.org 